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THE intrinsic importance of the attacks in which American troops have already taken part is not great, but the American newspapers are fully justified in playing them up. We have been sending an army to France under very unusual conditions. All of the other nations participating in the war have been fighting for years, and have proved repeatedly the bravery and the grit of their citizen soldiers, and their ability to endure the gruelling losses which are characteristic of modern offensive warfare. The American army is a late comer on a blood-soaked battlefield. All Americans hope and believe that it will fight as well as its comrades in arms have fought, and they are awaiting eagerly and confidently actual testimony to that effect. During the last few weeks the testimony has been forthcoming. American troops are being subjected to the severest ordeal to which modern warfare is putting the private soldier—the ordeal of being able to keep together and to carry through an attack against artillery and machine-gun fire. They are proving equal to the test, and it is natural for the American people to greet the testimony with manifest satisfaction. The attacks at Cantigny and Bouresches are the forerunners of a long succession of offensives which will be carried on by the American army with all the élan of youth and all the determination of complete conviction. The job of breaking the force of the German offensive this summer will necessarily fall chiefly to the French and British armies, but after they have succeeded in defeating the Germans they too will be pretty well exhausted. The task of counter-attacking until the Germans are driven out of France will belong chiefly to the American army. It is destined ultimately to serve as the spear-head of the Allied force. It is learning how to push its thrusts home.

WHEN the German offensive first became threatening in March, it was announced that American battalions would be incorporated in French and British units so as to accelerate the fighting availability of American man power. Presumably steps to this end have been taken, but there is as yet no indication of it in the news from the front. The sectors on the eastern end of the line, in which American troops are entrenched, cannot be held by less than divisions. The recent attacks, in which parts of the American army have been engaged, could hardly have been carried on by a force smaller than a regiment at Cantigny and a division at Bouresches. If the identity of the larger American units can be preserved, so much the better; and of course it is particularly desirable to avoid breaking up a special organization such as that of the marines. But we trust that the plan of brigading the less trained American soldiers with British and French units is not being abandoned. There is no other way in which the increasing American man power in France can be made so quickly available, and in which the American army can secure the immediate services of the more experienced British and French staff organization. Notwithstanding the beneficial effect of the recent operations by American troops on American public opinion, there should be no hesitation about wiping out for the time being the inde-

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pendent organization of a large part of the American army—provided that by so doing the German offensive can be more effectively checked.

A JAPANESE military expedition into Siberia as a war measure against Germany would have defeated its own purpose. The Japanese army would never have been able to approach any considerable force of Germans. In the meantime it would have been fighting Russians. The Japanese government would have demanded compensations for its expenditures—compensation which could only have assumed the form of concessions or annexations in Siberia. If the expedition had been undertaken with the consent of the Allies, we should in effect have been making war on Russia under the pretext of making war on Germany, and we should have demanded from the Russians compensation for our invasion of their own territory. These drawbacks are not avoided by the new plan of intervention. If the inter-Allied expedition were undertaken without the consent of the Soviet government, it would be occupied for many months in overcoming Bolshevik resistance to its movements. The new eastern line which it would eventually establish would still be removed by thousands of miles from the nearest German military force. The Soviets would be weakened in their resistance to Germany by the attack in their rear, and the German government would be given abundant excuse for increasing penetration. The Allies would be doing in Siberia what the Germans have been doing in the border provinces, that is, organizing a government favorable to themselves and supported by their bayonets. Finally, Japan would furnish the bulk of the invading army and would not withdraw unless compensated at the expense of Russia. The Allies would be paying enormously for a doubtful military advantage.

PRESS despatches from Washington contain definite predictions of a coming change in President Wilson's attitude towards intervention in Russia. He now favors, so it is stated, the plan of an inter-Allied expedition into Siberia, consisting chiefly of Japanese troops, but headed by a civil commission, which after Siberia was occupied would call a constituent assembly and on its authority establish a new Russian national government. We shall not credit these reports until the President confirms them by public acts or declarations. The new plan of intervention is advocated by many able and disinterested Russian patriots, and it is designed to avoid certain objections which had most to do with the defeat or the postponement of the first plan of a Japanese military expedition into Siberia. But it does not succeed in really avoiding the most fundamental drawbacks to military intervention. The Allies would still be taking sides in a Russian domestic controversy, which would compel them to fight Russians rather than Germans, and which would in effect be turning European Russia over to Germany in exchange for a part of Asiatic Russia. It would still violate those principles which guided President Wilson's policy in the case of the Mexican revolution and which, we feel sure, he will not abandon except under drastic compulsion. In his recent address to the Mexican editors he expressly associated the policy which he is now pursuing in Russia with the policy which he formerly pursued in Mexico.

SOME of the advocates of military intervention in Russia have recently begun to turn their attention to the possibility of introducing a nuclear force by way of the Arctic and the White Sea. In support of such a project it may be urged that Russian suspicion of imperialistic purpose would be less acute than in the case of intervention by way of Vladivostok. It would be hard for anyone to believe that America, England or France desired permanently to occupy the frozen wastes of Arctic Russia. If press reports are to be relied upon, Allied marines have for some time been operating in these regions for the protection of the Murmansk railway without eliciting from the Bolsheviki any protest against the technical violation of Russian soil. The contrast with the effect on Russian opinion of the Japanese landing at Vladivostok is illuminating. Another point in favor of intervention from the north is that the ports of Kola and Archangel are about six thousand miles nearer the German front than Vladivostok. This fact greatly reduces the chance that an Allied expeditionary force, however honestly directed against the Germans in the first instance, might find its energies dissipated in a civil war in Russia. But it may be said that the Allies have no ships to spare for use in the Arctic. If this is true, it is equally conclusive argument against intervention by way of Vladivostok. For Russia to take the field against Germany with anything less than a force of half a million men, well equipped and munitioned, would be suicidal. But the Trans-Siberian road alone is not capable of supplying such a force. We have no right to ask Russia to fight unless we can find ships to supply munitions through Kola and Archangel.

FROM whatever quarter an expeditionary force might be launched, it would depend for its effectiveness upon its power to rally Russian man power against Germany. Japan has never proposed to send to the German front more than fifty

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thousand men, in itself a wholly negligible force as numbers go in this war. The Allies would be loath to send half as large a force to the Arctic. The pertinent question is, however, not one of the relative magnitude of the two proposed expeditionary forces—both insignificant—but of their relative power to rally to their support Russians not interested primarily in the domestic reorganization of Russia but in resisting German penetration. In Finland and the adjacent Russian territory there are hundreds of thousands of men, intensely anti-German, kept with difficulty under control by a minority notoriously pro-German and actually supported by German arms. That great numbers of these men would gladly enroll under the Allied banners is not open to doubt. But here is the point that is embarrassing to the amateur statesmen of the western press. The anti-German elements of Finland and western Russia are the Reds. Are we ready to cooperate with them against the Germans and the forces of "law and order" now inviting German intervention? To answer this would test the sincerity of the entire interventionist propaganda.

PRODUCTIVENESS is the first requirement of any revenue law to be enacted in war time, but universality and equality are not much less important. If we are to raise $8,000,000,000 in taxation we ought to exhaust the resources of fiscal science in our attempt to distribute the burden uniformly. The income tax and excess profits schedules ought to be systematically overhauled, and all other sources of revenue ought to be thoroughly canvassed. It is quite possible that the French plan of taxing sales of luxuries—including the more expensive grades of necessary articles—might yield a very considerable revenue. The revenues on tobacco could safely be doubled, and taxes on coffee and tea would reach a considerable mass of disposable income. There is also much to be said for the imposition of a heavy federal inheritance tax. During the war and in the subsequent period of liquidation of war debt, there will inevitably be much tax-dodging. An inheritance tax is partially corrective of this evil. The objection that since the inheritance tax is already an important source of state revenue, a heavy federal tax would represent an onerous burden, has long since been adequately answered by authorities on taxation. The tax could be made exclusively federal by the device of surrendering an appropriate share in its proceeds to all states not levying inheritance taxes.

FOR the next year the Allied world is assured that the food shortage will not be acute. America's wheat harvest, properly husbanded, will be sufficient to supply all the requirements of our Allies and ourselves. The patriotism and energy of the American farmer deserve unstinted credit for this happy solution of our food problem. Whatever his discontent with the prices officially determined, the farmer has prepared a record acreage. We should, however, be laboring under a serious delusion if we failed to recognize that a benign growing season has had much to do with our prospects of abundance. At the time of the sowing we had no assurance that the yield would not fall short of the billion bushel mark by two or even three hundred millions. This would have meant short rations for the whole Allied world. The need for an American surplus of wheat will be as acute in 1919 as it is in the present year, and we can only assure ourselves that the need will be met by making much more extensive preparations for the sowing than we made last year. We have abundance of time: let us not go through another winter and spring with our food supply and our chances of an early victory dependent upon the favor of the season. What acreage would yield a billion bushels under the most unfavorable conditions known to the Department of Agriculture? This should be our minimum for next year's crop.

Independence for the Austrian Slavs

AMERICANS have never regarded the perpetuation of the Hapsburg monarchy as anything but an evil. In the days of the Hungarian struggle for independence, American opinion was intensely sympathetic with the Magyar patriots. Bohemia's claim to independence was widely accepted in America as valid, long before the present war illuminated the horrors endured by a nation, held in subjection in peace and dragged to the field in war to fight for its oppressors against its friends. The claims of the Jugo-Slavs to national unity and independence were hardly known to Americans before the Balkan wars. But since we have come to recognize the South Slavs as a real nation we have accepted in theory their right to an independent national development. The division of Austria-Hungary into four states, German, Magyar, Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav, with the transfer to Poland, Rumania and Italy of territories nationally adhering to those states, would answer exactly to the American conception of a just disposition of the Austro-Hungarian problem.

But America is dowered with a sense of the practical as well as with instincts of justice. She wishes independence for the lesser nations, but an independence which can maintain itself as a reality. What Americans know of Balkan conditions under

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a regime of small independent states is not reassuring. Every Balkan state has been a nest of intrigue, with political parties openly working in the interest of one or another of the great Powers. Indeed, in those states politics has meant little more than the art of international intrigue. And war has been constantly in the background of politics, not merely localized war, but war involving some or all of the great Powers. If Austria-Hungary were dissolved into its elements, would the Balkan situation repeat itself on a grander scale? There lay the danger; and it was the fear of such an outcome that inclined most Americans, in the first years of the world war, to a provisional solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem through federation. Let the constitution of the empire be so amended that in all internal affairs the four chief nationalities would be autonomous, and that in the common business of commercial policy and foreign affairs one nationality would have as much weight as another.

Whether this was or was not a practical solution in 1915 has since fallen into the limbo of historical questions that must remain forever unanswered. Under the pressure of war, evolution proceeds at a bewildering pace; every element in a complex problem of international relations takes on a new form. The union of the Czechs and the Slovaks, in 1915 still little more than an inspiration of the literati, has since become solid reality in the popular consciousness. The same thing is true of Jugo-Slav union. Thus the internal conditions of independence have gone far toward realization. At the same time the terrible repression of the imperial government has greatly intensified the antagonism of the Slavic nationalities to any compromise with the Germans and the Magyars. The idea of a lasting federation with German and Magyar is to a patriotic Czech or Croatian about as abhorrent as the idea of a federation with Prussia is to the Frenchman or Belgian. Such federations can be maintained only by force, either from within or without. And since the Germans and Magyars of the empire do not of themselves possess the force to hold the Slavic nationalities to a repugnant union, they would of necessity lean upon a foreign power—Germany. The solution of federation lapsed when the Emperor Charles's peace tentatives failed. The only alternatives now worth practical consideration are the abandonment of the subject nationalities to uncontrolled Germanization and Magyarization, or their liberation under conditions insuring their safety.

Such conditions can not be established by a mere stroke of the pen. It is not enough if the peace congress declares the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav states to be free. These will remain small states, however their boundaries may be drawn, and vexed in the early years of their history by domestic political problems capable of involving international complications. What, for example, shall be the rights of the German and Magyar minorities in Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia? What shall be done with the German and Magyar feudal land holdings in the territories of the new states? When we find in America men who desire to intervene in Russia in defense of the feudal land holdings of Russians, it becomes impossible to conceive that the fate of German landholders in the Czech lands will be a matter of indifference to Germany, or the fate of Magyar landholders in the Slovak lands to Hungary. When we find that conflicts in economic policy in Finland or the Ukraine call into existence a strong party that welcomes German support, we cannot doubt that German and Magyar parties will emerge in Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia. And what such parties mean for the future peace and independence of those states it is superfluous to dilate upon. A united Austro-Hungarian empire might possibly never be more than a dependency of Germany. A group of minor states carved out of the Austro-Hungarian realm and left to sink or swim would certainly fall under the dominance of Germany.

For the Balkan states could at least play one great Power off against another, and so maintain a semblance of independence. If the Austrian party in such a state seemed to be growing too powerful, the opposing party could draw heavily upon Russian resources; and if the political weights still failed to balance, there were maritime powers to be interested in the situation. There is no such machinery available for the new states to be won from the Dual Monarchy. For a generation, probably, Russia will not count beyond her own boundaries, and France and England will not care to engage in a perennial game of intrigue in Central Europe. They do not have the kind of direct interest in Central Europe that would compel ceaseless vigilance and adequate preparation against German designs. Italy's special interests do not extend beyond the Adriatic littoral.

If then, as everyone must now agree, it is vital to the Allied cause to wrest the Slavic nations of Central Europe from German control and to keep them free from German influence after the war, it is obviously necessary to set up an adequate international defense for them. This means that the first step toward the definite break-up of Austria-Hungary must be the establishment of a league of nations. It is not worth while to call Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia into existence, to succumb shortly to German imperialistic enterprise. But no one would deny that it is worth while to call

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them into existence as free members of a great world league pledged to defend them against foreign aggression. The league is necessary to their existence. And the league in its turn would gain in its power of coercing the only nation likely in the next decades to seek to disturb the peace—Germany—if it commanded the resources of two vigorous Slavic states in the heart of Europe.

Were it announced to the world that the Allied states had joined in a league of defense, to which all nations desirous of living in peace might become parties, and that the league recognized the independence of the two Slavic states of Austria-Hungary, the prospects of conclusive Allied success would at once become brighter. Every Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav in Austria's armies would know that in fighting on the side of the Central Powers he was helping to defeat, not a shadowy hope of a nominal independence, but a binding promise of real independence, supported by the whole resources of the league. The hundreds of thousands of Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs in America, now technically classified as enemy aliens and kept out of the war, would be given an opportunity to show in what esteem they held the independence of their native lands. The Austrian Slavs are among the world's most resolute fighting men, when they have a cause to fight for. We can give them a cause that would make fighting men even out of a race of cravens.

It is dangerous for the Allied nations to wait for the peace conference to lay down the principles upon which the nations are to be associated for the maintenance of peace. Such an association is needed now, as a guaranty to Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, Russians and Ukrainians and Finns that if they will throw off the net of German influence, the nations of the world stand ready to defend their independence forever. We cannot wait for the peace conference to enlist the resources of Slavdom in our interest. They have an essential part to play in winning the war against Germany.

For let us face the military situation squarely. The German offensive may soon come to a standstill, or it may be resumed with even greater violence, but it cannot win a decision. Gradually, as the American army increases in numbers and gains in experience the initiative will pass to the Allies and the Germans will be forced back, kilometre by kilometre, shortening their lines as their reserves fail, husbanding their resources to the utmost. For how long a period can they resist us, even though outnumbered, outgunned, cast down in spirit by the sure prospect of ultimate defeat? Until Slavdom in their rear rises in a conflagration of revolt, the Russians rolling back over the lands lost at Brest-Litovsk, the Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs forcing upon Bulgaria and Hungary a mood for peace, the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles menacing Germany in the flank. When that time comes Germany will be ready to accept a peace that offers her nothing but her own place as one among the nations, deriving her security, not from her own broken sword, but like the least of the nations, from the might and goodwill of the community of the world.

The War Policy of British and American Labor

ON another page we publish an illuminating communication from Prof. Arthur O. Lovejoy of Johns Hopkins University, who accompanied the American Labor Mission on its recent visit to France and England. Prof. Lovejoy's object in writing the letter is to enter certain objections against a couple of paragraphs printed in the New Republic of May 25th, in which the attitude and behavior of the American labor delegation during their stay in England and France was criticized for being too cocksure and too inconsiderate of the opinions of the majority of British labor leaders. But he does not confine himself to comment on the manners and the attitude of the American labor delegation. He discusses with helpful lucidity and candor the differences between the war policies of British and American labor, and the questions raised by him are of sufficient importance to call for careful consideration.

In his comments on the manners of the American labor delegation during their French and English trip, Prof. Lovejoy does more to vindicate than to controvert the criticism of the New Republic. He states frankly that "their tone and manner (or at least the tone and manner of their chairman) in dealing with those with whom they differed were often needlessly brusque, harsh and unconciliatory." This is surely a deplorable spirit in which to conduct an international propaganda. Considering the sacrifices which French and British labor have made for the common cause during the last four years, as compared to the sacrifices made by American labor, the former had some reason to resent their treatment by an American labor mission in a "brusque, harsh and unconciliatory" manner. Diplomacy of this kind is out of keeping with the spirit of a country which is seeking above all to promote international understanding and good will. The same cocksure and unconciliatory attitude was plainly revealed by interviews given out by James A. Wilson and William Short after their return from Europe. The former referred sneeringly to "certain classes of people who term themselves leaders of labor, and who in reality are not

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working men but members of a labor political party," while the latter commiserated the unfortunate wage-earners of Great Britain because they were not led by "a statesman of the calibre of Samuel Gompers." One may infer from these comments how successful the American labor delegation must have been in persuading French and British labor to abandon their own leaders and bow to the higher American statesmanship.

More important, however, than the bad manners and the harsh and arrogant spirit, which the American mission brought to its task of propaganda was the difference in substance between the war policy of the A. F. of L. and that of the French and British labor parties. The difference turns, according to Prof. Lovejoy, exclusively upon the desirability of holding "an international labor and socialist conference during the war at which German and Austrian delegates shall be present." The Americans are opposed to such a conference and the British and Frenchmen are strongly in favor of it. Prof. Lovejoy discusses this difference of policy from a novel and interesting point of view. The ordinary objection to an inter-belligerent conference is that if the German and Austrian socialists attended, they would do so merely as the emissaries of their own governments, and that any conversations, direct or indirect, with agents of the German government would be tantamount to conniving at an attempt to obtain a German peace. Prof. Lovejoy, however, objects to the proposed inter-belligerent conference on another and a better ground. He points out, as the New Republic has frequently done, the elaborate preparations which the inter-Allied Socialist leaders made to provide in advance against this ordinary objection to an inter-belligerent conference. The proposed gathering is hedged about by "the most rigorous conditions." The German and Austrian socialists will not be allowed to attend unless they declare publicly their adhesion to the principles of no annexations and no indemnities, and to the right of national self-determination. In his opinion these conditions, while they may relieve this project of pro-Germanism, condemn it to futility. "No such gathering could conceivably be held" "until the forces now in power in Germany are reduced to impotence," and when they are reduced to impotence, "no such conference will be necessary as a means of winning the war."

Before discussing Prof. Lovejoy's own criticism of the plan of an inter-belligerent conference, it is useful to remark how completely it disposes of the more popular objection. The more popular objection really derives from a false impression that the proposed conference is an insidious intrigue devised by furtive pacifists for the purpose of promoting a compromise German peace. Prof. Lovejoy exposes this crude and frequently malicious misinterpretation. He exonerates Mr. Henderson from the imputation of sending Allied delegates to a conference held "for the purpose of bargaining away any of the essential guaranties of a just, democratic and lasting peace," as already defined in the inter-Allied Socialist platform. Mr. Henderson and his associates will not enter a conference with the Germans except under conditions which prove the sincerity of their desire to make the war contribute to the overthrow of militarism. Mr. Lovejoy's objection is that the proposed conditions would prevent the conference from having any useful result. If the proposed gathering were possible, it would in his opinion be unnecessary. As a matter of fact he considers it impossible, and, being impossible, the effort to hold it might distract the minds of wage-earners from the stern necessity of winning a military victory.

As we understand the position of Mr. Henderson and his French, Belgian and Italian associates, they would fully admit at least the improbability of the acceptance at present by the German and Austrian Socialists of the proposed conditions. But they consider the attempt to secure an inter-belligerent conference worth while even though it fails of immediate success, because of the beneficial effect of the attempt on the state of mind of the wage-earners in all the European belligerent countries. That state of mind is different in Europe from what it is in America. The European workers are more socialist in their convictions, more suspicious of their own governments and more exhausted by the prolonged strain of the war. The proposed inter-belligerent conference would serve to place the supreme emphasis upon the disinterested and genuinely international purposes of the Allied political programme. The British labor leaders expect by means of such an emphasis both to increase dissensions in Germany and Austria and to keep their own following loyal to the war, no matter how long it may be necessary to fight in order to defeat Germany. If the German socialists failed to accept the conditions they would be repudiating the principles which hitherto have formed the common possession of international socialism, and the result would eventually be a wider split in the German socialist party and the accelerated growth of the independent faction. If the German socialists accepted the conditions, but were prevented by their own government from attending the conference, the result would be a renewed internal conflict in Germany and an increase of conviction among the workers all over the world that the German government was the ultimate

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enemy. On the other hand the offer of an inter-belligerent conference by the inter-Allied labor groups, with the consent of their own governments, would be an incontrovertible demonstration of the good faith of the Allies in seeking a just and lasting peace and would enable the leaders of the loyalists in France and Great Britain to overcome any tendency among their following to submit to German peace proposals. It constitutes the best method of taking full advantage of the moral superiority of the Allied cause, and of using it to strengthen the ability of the wage-earning classes to endure the strain of a grinding war of attrition. Surely the opinion of Mr. Henderson and M. Albert Thomas upon the means which need to be taken in order to counteract pacifist agitation and keep their own followers loyal is more likely to be correct than that of American labor leaders.

The emphasis which the British and French labor parties place upon using political as well as military weapons in the campaign against militarism is born of the disillusioning result of fighting for so many years without the assistance of democratic diplomacy. Until the spring of 1917 the Allied government did not try to identify their military effort to defeat the German armies with a constructive international political programme. On the contrary, they signed among themselves a series of treaties, which were determined largely by military considerations and which if they had been executed would have tended to perpetuate war and militarism. Neither did this disposition to ignore political values disappear after the Russian Revolution and after President Wilson's salutary attempt to de-militarize and democratize the original war aims of the Allies. They were ignored throughout the summer and fall of 1917 in the dealings with Russia, and one result of this neglect was to accelerate the fall of Kerensky and the rise of Bolshevism. Another result was a lack of political unity which interfered with unity of military command and which was in part responsible for the reverses of the Italian armies last fall. After these past mistakes, committed by the Allied governments in Europe because they subordinated political to military considerations, is it strange that French and British labor should emphasize the need of emphasizing political values? Necessary as they believe military victory to be and willing as they are to make inexhaustible sacrifices to secure it, they cannot after this experience accept the naive assumption of American labor that the world will be made safe for democracy merely as a consequence of German military defeat. An enduring political victory can be accomplished only by keeping political values alive even in the unfriendly atmosphere of war.

When, consequently, Mr. Henderson declares that "British labor seeks to reenforce military operations by a wise and discriminating use of moral and political weapons," he is not using a phrase whose only virtue is its attractiveness. Belief in the truth of this phrase results in many concrete decisions of the utmost importance for the winning of the greater qualitative victory, upon which the President has fastened the attention of the Allied peoples; and all of those decisions would seek to take the fullest possible advantage of the imponderable factors in the war, in which, as we all believe, the Allies possess an incontestable superiority over their enemies. It is worth while to propose an inter-belligerent conference, conditioned on a common acceptance of international principles, because the fulfilment of those principles would constitute a complete defeat for Germany and a complete victory for the Allies. It is worth while to oppose armed intervention in Siberia because the military advantages would be dubious and slight compared to the manifest political penalties. It is worth while to avoid conscription in Ireland because when you force a nation to fight unwillingly you do a moral harm to the cause of the Allies which outweighs its military benefits.

Finally it is worth while to interfere as little as possible with the free expression of public opinion, because a government which suppresses honest, if erroneous, opinion incurs the suspicion of being afraid of it. The Allied cause is so good and the German cause so bad that the use of coercion in order to remove criticism is a confession of incompetence. A much more enduring and substantial unity of opinion can be obtained, and one of greater military value, by adopting measures to avoid grievances and convert recalcitrants. The chief obstacle in England and America to the conversion of recalcitrants at present is the violent means which are being taken to suppress harmless and useful differences of opinion. In all these cases the subordination of political to military values involves a military as well as a political loss. The war will be won more worthily, more quickly and more certainly not only by putting the available political weapons to the utmost use but by refraining from political mistakes which will be of advantage to the enemy. War against German militarism becomes justified in its implacability just in so far as the Allied governments preserve the sharpest possible distinction between their intelligent fidelity to the political ideal of ultimate pacification and the German repudiation of it.

Those, consequently, who seek to win the war with moral and political weapons, as well as military, are not using a phrase whose only result

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would be a more or less dubiously successful inter-belligerent conference on war aims. They are giving expression to a state of mind, which, while just as insistent on victory as is that of American labor, is equally insistent on conceiving final victory in political terms. What Mr. Henderson means by a victory for the Allies is the overcoming of those obstacles which now prevent the Allied government from accomplishing a constructive programme of ultimate pacification. The worst of these obstacles must be removed by force, but others must be removed by negotiation and by a patient, painstaking and fearless effort to organize international security. We prefer the attitude of British and French labor to that of American labor, because of its passionate interest, even during war, in this work of political reconstruction; because of its profound belief that the wage-earners as a class have an indispensable contribution of their own to make to this work of reconstruction. American labor also has formally subscribed to this belief. It has claimed special class representation at the peace conference. But under its present leadership it is doing nothing to justify special representation, because it is refusing to make any contribution to a solution of the political problem behind and beneath the war. As Professor Lovejoy points out, their spokesmen had little to say while abroad about the "hope of preventing future wars and future acts of international injustice by the establishment of a genuine society of nations." And if they had little to say about "the supreme hope and object of America in the war" there is only one sufficient explanation of their comparative silence. As the past policy of the American Federation of Labor in its class struggle has plainly showed, its leaders are lacking in political vision and in constructive political conviction. If they are not interested in the use of political weapons and if they are harsh and unconciliatory in their manner, their behavior is caused by inability to understand and to share the political and social idealism of their French and British brethren.

Centralized Labor Recruiting

THE growth of our armies and their entrance into the fighting line steadily increases the pressure on our war industries. The demand for workers, skilled and unskilled, increases correspondingly. We have only begun to mobilize our full labor power. There is no national shortage of labor. And yet there is hardly a munition plant in the country, or a shipyard or an arsenal, that is not eagerly looking for additional men. This abnormal demand has upset the prevailing levels of wages, has stimulated thousands of workers to move from one plant to another, from community to community, from ocean to ocean. The labor turnover in essential war industries is abnormally great. In an effort to counteract this evil, employers have felt compelled to compete with one another for men. Even the production departments of the government have been forced into competition against one another. The attempted remedy has aggravated the evil and set in motion a vicious circle that has seriously impaired our productive efficiency.

The demand for common labor is especially acute. And yet the records of the Department of Labor show that from 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the available common labor is not productively employed. These men are so rushed from place to place by the feverish competition for their service that they are not only producing nothing but are wastefully choking our already overburdened railroads.

The evil has reached a point where it can be checked only by the centralization of all labor recruiting in the hands of the United States Employment Service. The Director General of this service has issued an appeal to all employers engaged on war work to abandon advertising and competitive labor recruiting and to make the offices of the United States Employment Service their exclusive agents. During the past five months the United States Employment Service has established three hundred and forty branch offices in the industrial and agricultural centres. The service is undergoing rapid extension. By voluntary agreement, the public employment offices of the various states have been integrated with the federal service. The United States Employment Service is now prepared to act as the exclusive labor recruiting agent for all war industries. That it should so act has become an imperative national necessity. By a continuation of the present anarchy in the labor market, we should be inviting disaster at home while our soldiers are dying for victory in France.

To stabilize the labor market and to protect both employers and workers from the intolerable evils of cut-throat competition, the Director General of the United States Employment Service has appealed to all employers engaged on war work to place a full statement of their requirements in his hands or those of his agents. To meet the demand promptly and effectively, the service must know how many additional workers are needed by crafts, establishments and states.

How are the additional men to be secured? In the first place by putting an end to the waste of man power resulting from the capricious migration in-

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duced by competitive recruiting. Next by drawing upon the non-essential or less essential industries. The time has come when non-essentials must be sacrificed to essentials. Nothing in the nature of labor conscription is contemplated. The War Labor Policies Board, to which the United States Employment Service is responsible, will undoubtedly rely upon the known patriotism of the vast majority of employers and workers for voluntary cooperation in the execution of plans which the President, through Secretary Wilson, has instructed the Board to formulate. The Board is understood to be making a survey of the less essential industries with a view to mobilizing their man power to essential war work. All this is being done through conference and voluntary cooperation.

But in a nation so large as ours it is inevitable that there should be a few individuals who will fail to respond to the appeal of the government. In fairness to the great majority who will eagerly subordinate their individual and personal interests to the paramount interests of the nation, it will become necessary to put a certain degree of pressure upon the recalcitrants. Just as the War Labor Policies Board will undoubtedly be guided in the distribution of labor by the production departments of the government, so it may be assumed that the War Industries Board and the Fuel and Railroad Administrations will support the Labor Policies Board in its plans. If it becomes necessary in the interest of war production, it is to be assumed that obstructive employers will be deprived of raw materials, coal and transportation facilities. The Labor Policies Board should, of course, make every reasonable effort to secure voluntary cooperation so that its plans may bear as lightly as possible upon the individual manufacturer whose business is jeopardized by the war. But it is under the highest obligation to put the national interest first and it will be unpardonably remiss if when the necessity arises it fails to act with unfaltering decision.

While seeking to protect the employers, the War Labor Policies Board will have to take equal precautions to protect the economic interests of the workers. One of the most serious and most natural causes of labor instability is the abnormal and unregulated fluctuation in wages. A great deal has been accomplished toward the steadying of labor in the shipyards by the awards of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board which has been standardizing wages, hours and other employment conditions along the Pacific Coast and from Maine to Texas on the Atlantic. In fairness to workers and employers alike, their standardization will have to be extended as rapidly as possible to all war industries until the sectional and local wage-earners have been equalized throughout the country. It is understood that the War Labor Policies Board is rapidly progressing toward a solution of this difficult problem and that it is similarly engaged upon the problems of housing and transportation of workers, both of which have seriously contributed to labor unrest and productive inefficiency.

The task confronting the War Labor Policies Board and more immediately the United States Employment Service is one of the most onerous which the war has placed upon the government. Its successful accomplishment calls for the unreserved and cordial cooperation of all parties to industry. For the time has come when industrial unity, which cannot be attained while competitive labor recruiting continues, is as essential to victory as unity of purpose and action in the fighting field.

States' Rights vs. the Nation

THE great battle in France and the U-boats off the Jersey shore are world events of such transcendent importance that naturally enough they throw every domestic occurrence into obscurity. But even in these days of grave international concern, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in nullifying the Federal Child Labor Law demands national attention. As a result of this decision the United States, engaged in a world struggle, finds itself not a unity, not a nation capable of dealing with vital problems on a national scale, but forty-eight separate communities each entitled to impose its own view of policy against its neighbors, each free to run counter to the needs and the wishes of the nation as a whole. Although dealing with commerce extending beyond the limits of a single state, although viewing this nation, as it must be regarded in all international relations, as a single country, speaking with a single voice, in matters affecting the entire land, the Supreme Court now says Congress is impotent to deal with the problem of child labor as the legislature of every civilized country in the world is empowered to deal with it.

We are in the midst of a struggle, the duration and scope of which no man can know. The extent to which we shall have to draw upon women and children, the safeguards under which we shall have to utilize their labor in order that the productive needs of this war may be satisfied without needlessly sacrificing the future stamina of our country, are anxious questions with which the nation's statesmanship must grapple as the exigencies of the great struggle from day to day compel. But the Supreme Court declares the nation impotent to deal with them, and asserts that such a grave issue as the protection of children must be left to the diverse judg-

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ments of the legislatures of the forty-eight states.

The very source and cause of the federal union was this anarchy of particularist legislation as to matters of common concern. In the midst of war the Supreme Court throws us back to the days of the impotent Confederacy. And when peace comes this country will be called upon with other countries to formulate a code of industrial law in order that the conflict of economic rivalries may be confined within urbane boundaries. There can be no doubt that certain social and economic international minima will be established. As to this very matter of child labor, standards were in process of being established by international agreement prior to the outbreak of the war. If the Supreme Court's decision is to stand, the United States will enter the great peace conference stripped of its authority to speak as a single nation on industrial matters of pertinent and pressing international concern.

We have a written Constitution and we must be prepared to pay the costs of its advantages. If the Constitution exacted this decision one would bow to the inevitable. It is not, however, the Constitution that seeks to hobble this nation but the unwarranted distortion of the Constitution by five men governed by a well defined intellectual bias and largely dominated by fear of the future. We cannot read the opinion of the Court without finding beneath its utterances a fear of future social legislation by Congress if the child labor law should pass constitutional challenge. With all respect for the Supreme Court as an institution, apart from and greater than its transitory membership, and with all respect for the conscience and patriotism of the present majority of the Court, we submit that in allowing themselves to be governed by fear for the future the majority plainly transcended their authority and unwarrantedly disregarded their own wise cautions in the past that legislative motive or policy is a matter for legislative conscience and not for Court review. No one, and particularly no lawyer familiar with prior rulings of the Court, can read the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes and retain a reasonable doubt that the majority wholly misconceived the issue before it when it struck down the Federal Child Labor law as a regulation of the purely internal affairs of a state. In an opinion of calm and luminous eloquence for which generations to come will be grateful, Mr. Justice Holmes makes short shrift of the wholly artificial issue of the majority opinion. "They [the states] may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer within their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress, their power to cross the line would depend upon their neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the states, but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the states. The public policy of the United States is shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole."

Thus, for the time being, and we must devoutly hope only for a very brief time, the Supreme Court has destroyed a law enacted by Congress in response to a rudimentary national need. But the mischief wrought is greater and deeper than that. By this decision, and the decision in the Hitchman case a few months ago, the Supreme Court has occasioned more disquietude for the orderly working out of economic and social questions than by anything it has done in one term of Court since the Dred Scott case.

The world is in ferment, and the problem of statesmanship is to guide the forces of unrest to new and stabler conditions of orderliness. That task will be gravely embarrassed and may well be rendered impossible if a judiciary immune not only from popular control but also from influence of those vital forces which govern and must govern the nation, should assert its obstructive veto against moderate and needful adjustments demanded by the changing facts of life. Fortunately such obstructions do not inhere in the Constitution. But if the interpretation of that document continues to rest with men who fail to exercise the vision of statesmanship, the nation will be forced to consider whether the dangers of entrusting to the fallibilities of a handful of judges the destinies of more than one hundred millions of people may not outweigh the value of the Court as the ultimate law giver.

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EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON

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The Battle of the Rear

Our Red Cross and the French

FOR a month past I have been living in an institution which shelters a hundred children from invaded France or the war zone. They look very healthy and happy at first sight; but gradually I have discovered that there is scarcely a child who is not somehow paying for abnormal experience. Marcelle's eyes are ringed with red; she was poisoned by gas. Denise has violent fits of temper; she saw her mother killed by a bomb. Marthe cringes before spring sun and wind; she was born in a cellar of occupied France. Louise grows pale and worried during the offensive; her mother has been evacuated for the second time. Obviously to fit this generation for future usefulness, very special care, nourishment and education will be necessary.

When I go out into the village, a small village twenty odd miles from Paris in a part of Seine and Oise, quite untouched by war, I am surprised to see five or six little boys and girls playing before every door. Has the department taken to repopulating France? Not at all; these are child-boarders. A few of them belong to families who fear the bombardment of Paris; more of them are children of women who have either lost their husbands or been forced by mobilization and the high cost of living to take their husbands' place. "Boarding out" has always been practiced by the French working-class, but not to this degree; what I note at ——— is a concrete by-product of the sudden transformation of France into a modern industrial country, which has taken place during the war, bringing with it the inevitable evolution of the working-woman from the home to the factory.

The national instinct for tradition and normality is so strong that the outer shells of custom, organization, institution, even now show few surface cracks in parts of France remote from dangerous areas; yet every province soon reveals to the attentive observer a profound modification of the life within the shell. Industry, for instance, has not merely transformed its methods; it has also migrated, is still in process of migration, from one region to another, creating in the rural districts, in the provincial towns, in the already teeming ports and industrial centres where it fixes itself the sort of health and housing problems which mushroom industrial growth has made familiar to America. Still another series of problems is raised by the refugees, who, whether torn up by the roots by a shift in the line of battle, or repatriated from the other side of the line because of disease and economic disability, arrive en masse, in almost complete destitution, in regions to whose intensity of local customs and habits their own local natures must be adapted; in regions, moreover, where food is already scarce and dear, and doctors are often altogether lacking. And one must add to these displaced populations the presence of refugees of other nationalities, Belgian and Serbian notably, and of soldiers in overwhelming numbers, active soldiers overflowing for travel, training, rest or leave from the war zone; mutilated, wounded, invalided soldiers temporarily or permanently in the rear.

The first year of the war the most vigorous minds of France, taking stock of the national dislocation, almost welcomed it as an instrument of progressive reform. Nothing short of this, they said, could have got our ancient civilization out of its fixed ways. If industrial, agricultural, political method came immediately under scrutiny, so especially did medical and social method. The women of the French leisure and intellectual class quickly realized that nursing soldiers was to be only a part of their war-time job; that more than ever social work would be necessary. Innumerable "Oeuvres" for every kind of war victim were founded, and gallantly and efficiently carried on, often under the direction of the most scientific minds of the country. Had the war ended in 1915 or 1916 much of the relief work now being done for the French civilian population by the American Red Cross would not have been necessary at all, and much of its more constructive social programme would have been initiated by the French themselves. But the war did not end, and in proportion as the need for revolutionary thinking and action on behalf of civilians grew more acute, French doctors, scientists, teachers, intellectuals were increasingly held at the front; those beyond the military age were virtually mobilized because the tension, the exhaustion, the pressing need of the hostilities, kept the keen edge of their brains and hearts on the fighting. By the spring of 1917, when the extent of the German destruction of the economic and human resources of the north became evident, even the most gallant progressives were asking themselves whether, after the war had been carried to victory, there would be living force left in the nation to turn it to account.

It was more than anything else to answer this haunting question that the American Red Cross founded its civilian department in July, 1917. Morale being recognized in this new kind of war,

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where civilians suffered almost as much as soldiers, as an important element of victory, to furnish emergency aid to the civilian population was obviously a legitimate development even of a strictly military organization. Here, too, was a means of canalizing and unifying all the sporadic sympathy and material gifts that had been flowing across the ocean toward the country to which America felt the deepest debt, the country where her own forces would be fighting in a few months. Possibly the leaders of the Red Cross did not go further than this last summer; possibly they did not then see their society playing a part in reconstruction in the larger sense.

Many of the social and medical specialists whom the Red Cross secured to take charge of its civilian bureaus, as it happened, knew very little about war. On the other hand, some of the problems of relief and reconstruction which were new to France, were familiar to their American experience; and ignorant though they often were of the language, customs, civilization of their ally, they jumped into deep water and began vigorously to swim. What saved their efforts from misunderstanding, from the charge of mere impertinence, was their disinterestedness and their flexibility. Unquestionably these men and women brought with them a method, a method which they believed would stand transplanting and which the French Oeuvres did not equally have in common. But their deepest desire was to use it only where and how France cared to have it used, and always in close cooperation with French specialists and French societies, to meet what France herself considered her greatest needs. They realized fully that they had as much to learn as they had to teach, and to make the learning easier and the liaison more complete, they took French assistants wherever possible. France responded by opening all the doors to the American collaborators with a touched sense of gratitude and fellowship.

The Department of Civil Affairs began its work with a staff of 13 persons; on April 1, 1918, it numbered 738, of whom 75 are physicians and 121 nurses. It now does regular work in 121 towns and cities, and emergency work at many points in the war zone. Emergency aid was at first, as I have said, very much emphasized. Here were the liberated and devastated areas with their returning populations, the dangerous areas, with their civilians who bravely and persistently stayed on; here was the zone of the interior, where the refugees and repatriates were accumulating — how could the Red Cross best help the French civil and military authorities and the French Oeuvres and the French doctors in these places? The answer was the foundation of nine bureaus later consolidated into six, as follows: Needy Children and Infant Mortality; Care and Protection of Tuberculosis; Refugees and Relief; Reconstruction and Relief; Reeducation of Mutilés; American Friends' Unit. Thirteen civilian hospitals and forty odd dispensaries are now under their direct jurisdiction and approximately 1,500 children who have been removed from the danger zone are also medically supervised.

An earlier article has outlined the organization of the Bureau of Reconstruction in the liberated regions and told of its temporary transformation, together with the admirable American Friends' Unit, which operated in the same territory, into a system of emergency relief in the war zone. The Refugee Bureau has, so far as Paris goes, been instrumental in providing lodgings for 5,000 people, working in detail through several excellent existing societies which it has taken over; outside Paris it has 71 delegates who cover 58 of the 76 uninvaded departments of France, meeting the convoys as they arrive and supplementing the French authorities whose efforts to find lodging, work and furniture for their unhappy compatriots are literally beyond praise. These delegates are almost always professional women with a socialized point of view, if not with actual social experience. Inevitably they seek not just to help France, through a difficult hour, but to promote reconstruction in the sense of the French progressives' hope. There they have the support of the socially trained doctors and nurses of the Tuberculosis and Children's Bureaus, who, through health centres and temporary hospitals in the refugee areas, are always working on those social service, public health, " follow-up " lines which will perhaps be America's greatest contribution to French hospital and out-patient work.

Probably the most scientific, the most constructive, as well as the most attaching part of the civilian work is that which the Children's Bureau carries on in direct combination with the Tuberculosis Bureau and the Rockefeller Commission for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in France. In certain dangerous areas directly behind the French and American lines Red Cross doctors and nurses are caring for the children of rural and semi-rural communities, and the mothers of young babies. The dispensary or hospital equipment is usually established in a centre from which a series of villages are visited once or twice a week by an automobile carrying doctor, nurse and nurse's aide, and the warmth with which they are received — sometimes no medical treatment has been possible for months — can scarcely be described. At Evian, where the convoys of repatriates arrive from Switzerland, the Red Cross has taken over the medical examination of the children, who make up from one-half to one-third of the arrivals, it has opened a hospital for children acutely or contagiously ill, and sends those

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who need convalescent care to a hospital thirty miles outside of Lyons. In Lyons itself and St. Etienne, another large industrial centre, in ports like Marseilles, even in Paris, it has been found desirable to establish dispensaries and hospitals. The dispensary work in certain arrondissements of Paris disclosed a widespread undernourishment, due to the increased cost of living and the Red Cross, as a method of preventive medicine, now supplements the school luncheons of 30,000 children; the ration of needy families is also supplemented on the order of dispensary doctors or nurses from food stocks deposited at the Mairies.

France cares intensely about her future generations and has in many ways been more effective than America in guarding them. Statistics of births and deaths are complete and accurate; the working mother is pensioned and medically directed if she chooses to join private charitable societies; the dependent child is far more generally than with us placed out in inspected homes rather than in institutions, though, of course, the enormous number of war orphans has increased the amount of institutional care; vacation colonies for school children are widespread. But infant mortality has remained very high and has increased since the war here as elsewhere, partly owing to a complete lack of public health nurses, to crowded living conditions, and insufficient knowledge of hygiene. Child-welfare, as it has been made familiar to the blasé American public, had never been campaigned for in France till the American Red Cross, together with the Rockefeller Commission, began last January.

The campaign opened with a large Franco-American demonstration in Chartres, addresses by French and American authorities and moving pictures. Since then an automobile camion carrying a Frenchman to lecture, a French and an American woman demonstrator, moving pictures, educational panels and illustrated literature, has been progressing slowly from Chartres to Brittany, drawing absorbed audiences wherever it stopped. In addition, a giant child-welfare exhibition was recently inaugurated at Lyons, on a date which happend to fall at the height of the terrible offensive. To the amazement of the organizers more than 173,000 people came, all the same, between April 9th and 30th, twenty per cent of the population of Lyons and its working class environs, proving conclusively to their minds the value of this sort of diversion to the ennui and anguish of war. Long lines of people were always waiting in rain or shine to get in, giving a feverish attention to everything from washing the baby to special diets, dental hygiene, movies of the fly evil and Punch and Judy shows on the dangers of ignorant nursemaids.

The fact that the pills of good advice are sugar-coated by America gives them a tang for the French palate, just now, that no strictly native pills would have; and the cordiality and sympathy with which Americans are received is enabling the Children's Bureau to make some intensive experiments in certain specified areas, both rural and urban, which it hopes may demonstrate statistically a fifty per cent fall in the infant death rate and provide an incontrovertible basis for the scientist, not only of France but of the world, to proceed from in future. Several corps of French nurses who are at present being trained by French doctors for public health work on American lines will be able to help the French seeds to sprout; it is, of course, largely on the persuasiveness and success of their work that the ultimate effect of the American propaganda will depend.

A somewhat similar campaign of propaganda among refugees for better housing and sanitation and modern agricultural and industrial methods, which may have far-reaching results in the reconstruction of northern France, is just being undertaken by the Red Cross Reconstruction Bureau and a group of leading French sanitarians, agricultural experts, industrialists, architects and government officials. This, too — though much less advanced than the Infant-Mortality and Tuberculosis campaigns — has somehow derived stimulus from the offensive. Indeed, just at the moment of the overthrow of its work in the liberated region, just when emergency resources for both soldiers and civilians are being called upon as never before, the more remote aspects of Red Cross work seem to be gaining ground and emphasis; if the war should end tomorrow, the most enduring monument to the American presence in France would unquestionably be the civilian work it has already accomplished.

If we were putting the increased strength of our arms into a war of conquest, this would indeed be illogical; but if we are fighting to make the democratic world of President Wilson's vision come true, it is fitting that America should concern herself with the future as well as with the present of France. Moreover, in solving these vital French problems, we are really, as one of the eminent doctors of the Children's Bureau has recently pointed out, working for our own children, our own tuberculosis, our own future emergency victims; and in the case of the agricultural experiment for the re-education of French mutilés, for our own war victims. The leaders of the American Red Cross have great resources behind them — thanks to the generosity of the American public — and a prestige as the representatives of America, which, with the emergency situation, makes it possible for them to accomplish larger scientific results than have ever been accomplished at home in the same time. Their

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responsibility is proportionate; only they among Americans really know how great a price France has paid for her historical situation and her moral endurance, and how tremendous her own effort to meet her own needs has been. The statistical record of the gifts of the Red Cross to French Societies and hospitals would go far to prove this, and it is for the French themselves rather than for us to say how they feel about the Red Cross work. A Frenchwoman who has been working with the Red Cross this year, expressed her feeling lately in a speech, "You have desired not only that we shall win the war, but that France shall live, live fully during the war and afterwards. It seems to me that the wish of the Red Cross and of the whole American nation has been not only to maintain the integrity of French territory but the moral and intellectual integrity of France. That is why you do not wish to let our race perish, why you struggle ardently against everything that menaces our vitality."

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT.

Paris.

Cannon

The Future

WE need some ruthlessness. For instance, at the beginning, when our cannon programme was first started, last spring and last summer, there was a great deal of "slacking" by capitalists. It seems monstrous to assert that caiptalists could be "slackers." But they were, many of them.

Firm after firm refused to accept contracts from the Ordnance Department. Firm after firm refused to have anything to do with the making of war-supplies urgently needed by the Ordnance Department. And the reason was clear.

On private contracts, on contracts for things to be delivered to other private firms, these capitalists were making fifty per cent, seventy-five per cent, a hundred per cent, on cost. No such profits could be made on public contracts. On public contracts the normal limit of profit countenanced by the Secretary of War was ten per cent, or, at the most, fifteen. Therefore public contracts were not popular. Therefore an astonishing number of factories, admirably qualified to produce war goods, continued to produce peace goods.

To meet this difficulty we began by adopting our usual expedient — talk. We talked about patriotism. We tried to use loquacity, loquacious hypnotism, as a substitute for organization. And we failed at it. And properly.

For why should a manufacturer step forward and volunteer to work for ten per cent when his neighbors and rivals are working for a hundred per cent? Why should he let his treasury of profits and of savings run low and run dry when his neighbors and rivals are accumulating millions of dollars to be used against him in after-the-war competition? What is his duty to his stockholders? Is it to ruin them while other men's stockholders are fattening?

This sort of volunteering is, in the mass, impossible. Many capitalists volunteered. But many did *not*. And the "slackers" among them were not converted by talk. They were converted, in the end, by simple ruthlessness, by simple coercion. Little by little, hesitatingly, tardily, after months wasted in wondering whether the country would stand for it or not and in wondering which department and which person at Washington ought to be responsible for doing it, we evolved a struggling system of "priority," of "priority" in the getting of raw materials for manufacture, of "priority" in the getting of transportation facilities; and thereupon the "slacking" manufacturers began to capitulate.

If they continued on private work, they would begin to starve for steel and for freight cars. If they accepted public work, they would be able to keep their organizations intact. They preferred a thin life to the grave. And they began to descend upon Washington apparelled in a great eagerness to make ordnance.

When we went to ruthlessness, it worked perfectly. And who has complained? Nobody. If the thing is applied to all alike, the American people are here to welcome it, no matter how ruthless it may be. We will take hardship, we will take industrial despotism, we will take anything, in order to win the war.

But, in the meantime, last spring and last summer and on into last fall, while we were wondering and wabbling about "priority," our ordnance officers spent thousands of precious hours chasing from factory to factory throughout our industrial districts laboriously persuading certain manufacturers to volunteer, and utterly failing to persuade certain others. It was a frightful waste. And we seem to be determined, this summer, to reproduce precisely that form of waste in another field.

For where do we stand now? We have just let our contracts for our largest cannon, 14-inch guns and 16-inch howitzers, to the United States Steel Corporation and to the Midvale Steel Company.

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Midvale had been reserved to the navy; but for this purpose a new enlargement of it will be built for the army. The project is enormous. The machine-tools, the new machine-tools, to be constructed for the United States Steel Corporation and for the Midvale Steel Company, to be used in boring and turning and otherwise machining these new largest cannon of ours, will number some 500 and will cost some $10,000,000.

And the mounts for these cannon must be built. They will be railway mounts. They will be operated on railway tracks. These cannon are too heavy to be put on horse-drawn or motor-drawn carriages. Our largest cannon on carriages will be our 240-millimeter (or nine-and-a-half-inch) howitzers.

The contracts for all of our carriage-cannon were let long ago. And we are even now producing certain railway-mount cannon, in considerable numbers and in very large sizes, up to 12-inch and 14-inch, by taking seacoast cannon and putting railway-mounts under them. And we are going to get similar guns, in similar sizes, with similar mounts, railway-mounts, new-made, from the navy for army use.

Our programme then, looking to the future, looking to deliveries, stands thus:

Our carriage-cannon and certain of our railway-mount cannon (namely, those secured from seacoast sources and those secured from navy sources) should come forward this summer and next fall and next winter in quantities sufficient to equip our fighters quite fairly adequately for the earliest spring operations of 1919. And:

The cannon to be built by the United States Steel Corporation and the Midvale Steel Corporation should begin to come forward by the end of next spring and should then continue to come forward in quantities sufficient to immediately replace all of the seacoast railway-mount cannon and all of the navy railway-mount cannon as soon as they are worn out, and then thereafter in quantities sufficient to provide an adequate number of railway-mount cannon for any fighting force that we can put into France at any time in 1918 or 1919.

That is our programme and our prospect. In the largest sizes of cannon now, as well as in the small and middle sizes, we are into the grooves. In some respects it has taken us a long time to get there. And why?

I have already expressed my judgment that no great groups of delays, of first-rate importance, can be attributed to the technical side of the government's management of our ordnance enterprises. And this judgment begins to be confirmed by current investigations. Those constant changes in specifications, so vexatious to manufacturers, and so much criticized, now begin to wear a new aspect as they are examined in detail. Almost three-quarters of them are shown to have been suggested by the manufacturers themselves. And again almost three-quarters of them, far from retarding production, are shown to have accelerated it. Our technical engineering faults, considering the circumstances, have been, I believe, relatively few, and, if we remember the scanty industrial experience of our ordnance officers, thoroughly excusable. But our business faults, I cannot help believing, have been numerous and grave and far from excusable.

Why, for instance, when the American 75-millimeter carriage was failing in production, did we allow it to go on failing for month after month without rushing to the rescue by putting the French carriage *also* into production? The final decision to add the French carriage to our list of products, to our list of chances, was a production decision, a business decision. Why was it so tardy?

I think that the reason for such faults, for such delays, must be found in the fact that Washington was not organized in such a manner as to subordinate the technical men, properly, for production purposes, to administrative men, to men who, whether soldiers or civilians, were primarily administrators. The technical men were left, far too much, to bear the burden of the technical side and of the administrative side both. They did wonders. But they could not do impossible wonders.

And their work was under no proper unified scrutiny from the top. There was no Chief Production Administrator, no Munitions Minister, no Director of Industry. To such a man, unblinded by immediate technical labors, the continuing manufacturing failure of the American 75-millimeter carriage would have been the one outstanding fact, the one most grossly immediate problem, in our whole ordnance programme last November. No such man was there to act. Nor, in fact, is any such man there now.

We are trying to talk ourselves into thinking that Mr. Stettinius is somehow a Minister of Munitions. But he is not. He is nothing so simple. Congressmen who have interrogated him recently have had the greatest difficulty in arriving at any conclusion whatsoever with regard to the precise character and the precise extent of his genuinely administrative powers. Through no fault of his own, he is one more adventure in complicated vagueness. And, in any case, in order to be Minister of Munitions he must be Director of Industry. The two things are the same thing. And who is Director of Industry?

Part of him is doubtless Stettinius, *Second* Assistant Secretary of War. Another part of him is Stettinius's superior officer, Crowell, who is *As-*

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sistant Secretary of War. Another part of him is Goethals, in his new position at the head of Purchases and Supplies and Storage and Transportation in the General Staff. Another part of him is Baruch, as Chairman of the War Industries Board. It was a conflict between the War Industries Board and the War Department that held our power programme up for several utterly lost weeks.

We are on our way toward a Directorship of Industry. We are still on our way toward it. It is the only known means of securing a unity capable of answering the unity of the German Supreme Command. But surely we shall never arrive at it by using the amiable weapon which consists of adding new rival Grand Viziers to Grand Viziers already existing. We shall arrive at it only by a perfectly ruthless use of the head-chopping and limb-cleaving powers of the Overman Bill. I wrote respectfully in favor of the passage of that despotic bill. I hope respectfully for a carnival of despotism in the application of it.

And it seems likely to be despotism and only despotism, it seems likely to be ruthlessness and only ruthlessness, that will carry our cannon-programme through this summer and next fall and next winter in its numerous work-places to its maximum possible success. Its maximum possible success is necessary. Its maximum possible success, with every work-place fully manned, with every machine fully operated, will give us the cannon we need. Any failure in man-power will give us less than the cannon we need. And there is a failure in man-power now.

We have built, we are building, a tremendous equipment. Private manufacturers have spent much money on it. The government itself has spent $200,000,000 on it, for factories and for machines, totally new factories and machines, with which to make cannon and cannon-carriages and explosives and shells. This equipment, some of it present already, some of it still to come, we will have. But will we fully use it? Today we are not fully using even the present existing part of it.

If our existing gun-carriage shops, now completed, were being worked twenty-four hours a day, full shifts, they would be producing seventy-five per cent or even a hundred per cent more gun-carriages than they are producing now. That is, our gun-carriage equipment, built at great cost and with great labor, is still lying idle a considerable number of hours every day and every night.

This state of things is intolerable. Voluntary enlisting of individuals for service in war-industries is no more successful, in mass, than voluntary enlisting of business firms was for taking contracts at ten per cent. There has to be an equality of sacrifice. We may talk. We may put up posters. We may shriek about patriotism. Those gun-carriage shops are not filled. They are far from filled. And the men in them keep moving on to other plants whenever the spirit moves them to move on. And there is no universal equality of sacrifice to make them know that it must in the end be just as wrong to abandon a gun-carriage which is being made to kill Germans as to abandon a gun-carriage which is killing Germans. There must be the same morality back here that there is over there.

General Crowder's "Work-or-Fight" order will have to be extended. I believe that there is virtually no doubt, in the heart of official Washington, that it will have to be extended. The delay is nothing but hesitation to face and to perform an act so drastic. It might be called "Conscription of Labor." But it is not conscription *of* labor so much as conscription *to* labor. It will hit the rich just as much as the poor. And it will hurt the rich much more than it will hurt the poor.

The artisan who is called to the colors and then exempted on the condition that he go to work in a gun-carriage shop need not suffer at all in the matter of wages. We can afford to pay him what he is accustomed to earning. But a young salesman who is now earning three or four thousand dollars a year may not by any means be so lucky. It may be difficult, it may be impossible, to provide him with a three-thousand-dollar or four-thousand-dollar job in the gun-carriage business. But he could learn to work certain sorts of lathes in a week. And he would be called on to make a genuine financial sacrifice. But he knows, and we all know, that it is nothing in comparison with the sacrifices made by similar men who are now wearing N A on their khaki coats.

And it seems likely that we may have to take over some of our war-factories, just as we have taken over our railways. In some of our war-factories the relations between employers and employees are abominable. The working-force is sullen, resentful, ineffective. The work turned out is slow and often very bad. Rejections of product, for badness, are excessive. The Ordnance Department cannot be held responsible. The responsibility lies with the attitude toward labor taken by the present employers. If to cure that attitude it is necessary to abolish those employers and to substitute the United States Government in their place, let us, if we want those cannon next spring, do that abolishing and that substituting now.

Our cannon are in the grooves. Our sole task now for cannon is to make those grooves smooth. It will take ruthlessness toward labor-supply and

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ruthlessness toward certain powerful private employers. If we have that spirit in us we can catch up with ruthless Germany by next year; and if not, not.

WILLIAM HARD.

Realpolitik in Russia

RUSSIA continues to perplex the Allied governments largely because of our profound, and necessarily profound, ignorance of the economic foundations of Russia. The cleavage in Russia proper, as well as in Finland, Courland, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, is not between political parties as such, but between economic groups. Practically all of Europe east of a line drawn north and south through Berlin is still almost as feudal as it was in the eighteenth century. There is little peasant proprietorship. The great estate owners predominate. East Prussia, Pomerania, Posen and the eastern provinces of Germany are the home of the Junkers. They own a great part of the land, which has come down to the present owners through direct line of descent from earlier centuries. The same is true of the Russian Baltic provinces. It is true of Austria-Hungary. It was true of a great part of Russia as well.

In western Europe on the other hand the feudal system was destroyed by the French Revolution. It broke up the land into small holdings. This was particularly true in France, Switzerland, South Germany, Holland and Denmark. But the economic forces of the French Revolution were stopped at the River Elbe, and the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg in 1807 were halted by the Prussian Junkers who refused to permit the decrees of the King, abolishing feudal conditions, to be adopted in their provinces.

Both politically and economically the feudal system was not abolished in Finland until 1907. It was ended in Russia by the revolution. In the Baltic provinces, in Poland and Ukraine the Junker class not only owns the land, but is frequently of an alien race. The Prussian Junkers are ethnically related to the ruling Junker class of the Baltic provinces from which they originally came. And the Baltic Junkers have been not only the land-owning caste; they have been the exclusive governing class as well.

We can only understand that part of Europe east of the Elbe, and the Allied Powers can only approach a solution of the Russian situation, by acknowledging and acting on these facts. They are fundamental to the entire Russian situation. And the outstanding factor in this situation is that the medieval, land-owning Junker aristocracy of Russia, from Finland to the Baltic Sea, is inevitably the ally of Prussia; while the peasants and workers of this whole territory are potentially at least the allies of the Entente Powers.

When the Revolution came in Russia its first act, on which all parties were united, was the expropriation of the feudal land-owning classes and the distribution of the land among the peasants. The Russian Revolution took a page from the history of the French Revolution. It determined to end forever the power of the ruling classes by taking away their property. The old feudal nobility, like the emigres of France, turned to Prussia. They turned to a neighboring country and a country ruled by the Junker class. They turned for protection, and they united with the Prussian Junker in the counter-revolutions of the Baltic provinces, Poland and Ukraine. For it was to the interest of Prussia to maintain the old feudal classes in this part of Russia, even if it could not be accomplished in Russia proper.

The White Guard government of Finland is an aristocratic Junker government. And the same is true of the other provinces. In other words, the Russian Junkers betrayed their country in order to save their estates. But they betrayed it to a class with which they are both ethnically and economically identified. They think alike about government. They think alike about socialism, revolution, disorder. And the bond between these classes is so powerful and the economic union so inevitable that the Allies can never hope for any support from the landed Junker and larger bourgeoisie classes in Russia or the Russian provinces.

Similar reasons underlie Germany's betrayal of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. It was the Junker military caste that refused to be bound by the resolution of the Reichstag majority. This Junker class, as stated above, controls east Germany. Its provinces border on Poland, Lithuania and Finland. And the Prussian Junkers did not dare and could not with safety permit Germany to recognize a revolutionary government in territories bordering on the east Prussian provinces. In self-protection they had to maintain a series of buffer feudal states from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Prussian Junkers disregarded the resolution of the Reichstag as a means of protection. They would have been lost with revolution at their back-door.

The Junker was driven to repudiate Germany's pledges for yet another reason. The great estates of the Prussian Junkers had been stripped of agricultural workers. They were being stripped before the war by the industrial suction to the great industrial cities of western Germany. And the Junker had been going to the Slavic provinces of the east for cheap labor. He cultivated his estate by immi-

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grants who came into Germany during the agricultural season to the number of several hundred thousand a year. They returned to their homes in the fall. And these great estates can only be cultivated in this way. Especially will this be so after the war. Had the Russian revolution swept over the western Russian provinces and distributed the land among the peasants, there would have been no migratory labor for Prussia. The peasants would have remained at home and cultivated their own lands. The Junker would own his estates, but he could not cultivate them. In fact he was faced with bankruptcy should the Russian revolution extend throughout western Russia. So the German Junker did a perfectly natural thing. He created buffer states, destroyed the revolutionary forces, and placed the Russian Junkers in control of the government and in possession of their estates as well. By so doing he saved the old feudal system; he created governments ethnically and economically sympathetic with Germany, and provided a bulwark against revolutionary contact from the east. Quite as important, by this means he provided hundreds of thousands of landless men who will migrate to Germany as casual laborers, as they have in the past.

Do not these conditions determine for us our relations with Russia? Do they not make it evident that we have nothing to hope from the old ruling classes in Russia or from any groups or classes identified with them? Their only possible hope is in Germany. And they are united with Germany by ethnic and economic bonds more strongly than with any other country in Europe.

These conditions also determine for us the only possible line of action that lies open to the Allied governments. Our only hope in Russia lies with the revolutionary groups. Not necessarily with the Bolsheviki, but with whatever government the peasants and the artisans may see fit to erect. And these are our natural allies. Whatever their form of government may be, it must be anti-German because the interest of the peasants and workers lies in preventing the Prussian government from reimposing the old feudal system in Russia, which is the one thing against which all revolutionary classes are united. Over and above everything else the Russian peasant wants to own the land.

It is not necessary to accept the Bolsheviki or any other party in recognizing that our interests lie with the Soviet government. But there is every reason in the world for believing that the form of government now existing in Russia will be permanent no matter what party comes into power. For the Soviet is the natural form of government in Russia. It is merely making constitutional the old community Mir, an organization that has existed in Russia for centuries. It is local, intimate, and established on the broadest possible basis of participation by all the people. It represents primarily the peasants. And the peasants will probably never lose the land. For in every country in Europe in which the land has been distributed, distribution has remained intact. The French Revolution distributed the land among the French peasants. There have been monarchies and reactions since then. The Bourbons and Napoleon came back. But the land never went back. And the essential democracy of France has never changed from a democracy of peasant owners. The local government and the Chamber of Deputies have always reflected the opinions and will of the millions of French peasants who were converted from serfs into proprietors, and who for a hundred and twenty-five years have remained firm in their possessions. The same is true of Holland, Switzerland and Denmark. Once destroyed, feudalism cannot come back. And when destroyed, the feudal classes lose their political power because their economic power is gone. The only aristocracies in Europe that exercise any material influence on the politics of their states are those aristocracies that have clung to their old feudal estates. And we may confidently expect the same to be true in Russia.

It is for these reasons that it seems irrefragable that the aristocracy of Russia and the buffer states would ally themselves with Prussia, and that the only possible class in Russia with which we can identify our interests is the class of peasant proprietors now coming into existence, who number ninety per cent of the population.

FREDERIC C. HOWE.

The Business of Being a Mother

FOR the first time in my life I have some neighbors; a block-full of them all living in small cement, two-family houses like my own. I do not know them well but I know a great deal about them.

My neighbors are all women and mothers. Doubtless there are husbands and fathers living with them, for we are a respectable suburb. But my story does not include them.

When I came here from the city where, naturally, I had no experience, I was an unskilled neighbor. And now after a year of observing the art I have only its rudiments. Perhaps this is due to the fact that I am so much interested in watching my neighbors that I can not be one. Perhaps certain facts about me shut me off.

My husband and I have a baby. It belongs to both of us. We also have jobs and a nurse. It was

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not long before I learned that this was wrong.

In the first place the baby should belong to me. Of course my husband should help me if I needed help; should shove the baby carriage and get up at night. But under my jurisdiction should come all matters connected with the baby's digestion and training, his clothing and airing. If he gets sick it should be primarily my business, though a kindly interest on the part of his father is permissible.

This is not the way we run our affairs. My husband is to have an equal share in the baby,—in his welfare and bringing-up and, when he acquires any, in his affections.

As a matter of fact neither of us just now carries a large part of the manual labor connected with his care. We bathe him often, with equal dexterity, and give him occasional bottles. During his infrequent hours awake we hear him gurgle with equal delight. For the rest we have a nurse—Miss Smith. She sleeps in the baby's room and tends him with manifold devotion. She is not a trained nurse but she has common sense and experience and a passion for infant care, and she believes in fresh air and cleanliness and quiet.

We are lucky to have found her, for she sets us free for our respective jobs. Both of us have work that can be done in part at home. This allows us to be in closer touch with our offspring than would be the case otherwise. But even if we had to be in town all day we should feel safe to leave him with his nurse. She treats her job as a profession and does it well.

Miss Smith has an instinct for neighborliness that tends slightly to improve the standing of the family. She is also an enthusiastic purveyor of local information. I have no need to join the Mother's Club, nor to drop around to Mrs. Lawrence's for a cup of tea. The finest flowers of neighborhood gossip are plucked, sorted and deposited at my dinner table. Thus have I learned that in several essentials I am fashioned wrong.

I assume that the baby belongs quite as much to his father as he does to me.

I have a nurse.

I have a job.

The first fault has made the least impression. But Miss Smith tells me of the complete aloofness of other fathers on the block and I feel sure that if Mrs. Lawrence and Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Beatty knew that my husband bathed the baby and changed him and gave him his bottle they would deeply disapprove. Not for these humble functions were fathers invented.

No one else on the block has a nurse. "You do have an easy time of it!" said Mrs. Beatty the other day. (I was catching my train for the city and a day's work.) "I never get time to go to town. Of course you have a nurse. I can't afford one."

She knows very well that her husband gets a better salary than mine. She wants, half unconsciously, to give herself and me the impression that I am living beyond my income and wasting my husband's substance. If I told her that my salary was decidedly bigger than that of my nurse, she would find easy refuge in my duty and natural functions as a mother.

"Don't you think," she said to Miss Smith a week ago, "that the profession of motherhood is the most important? I feel that I am doing more useful work taking care of my baby than if I had ten jobs."

Perhaps it was economic interest that led Miss Smith to take my side in this obvious assault.

It would take a good deal of argument to convince me—as many have tried—that I ought to drop my work, which I do fairly well, in order to take sole care of our baby, which I should do fairly badly,—especially the laundry work! I did not begrudge the few months I took off at the time of his birth; and if his welfare demanded it neither my husband nor I would hesitate to throw up our chances of success to minister to his.

But unfortunately for sentiment he is the healthiest child on the block. He is fat and boisterous and blooming as a rose.

In regard to the others, Miss Smith brings home harrowing tales.

"You know those new people down in 105? Well I stopped in there to tell them about a nurse. She's just had a baby. There was a carriage on the porch with the hood way down and a rug over the whole thing. I peeked under real soft expecting to see the new baby, and I nearly fell over. There was a big thing sitting up—in the dark. And *no* air. The lady told me afterwards she was eighteen months old. . . . And ours out in the cold with his hood back—and only five months!"

Her stories always take the form of invidious comparisons.

"I was over to Mrs. Beatty's today," she recounted with gusto. "She wanted me to show her how to start training her baby;—eight months old it is!"—with deep scorn. "I thought its hand looked kind of funny, and I touched it and the baby screamed. 'Why, it's bent out on her wrist!' I said. It stuck right out, like this. 'Yes,' she said. 'Do you think that's anything bad?' 'Well, what does the doctor say?' I asked. 'Oh, I never took her to the doctor,' she said. 'You think I ought to?' 'Well, I wouldn't if you don't want your baby to have the use of her hand,' I said to her. Women like that give me a pain. She hasn't anything to do *but* look after her baby."

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"What does Mr. Beatty say about it?" I asked in a thunderous tone, giving Mrs. Beatty up.

"Oh, I don't suppose she thinks it's any of *his* business," said Miss Smith.

For two months Mrs. Lawrence's baby hadn't gained an ounce. Mrs. Lewis had never given her baby any water because he choked the first time she tried it. Mrs. Williams has never taken hers out because it was a "fall baby." It stays indoors with the windows shut and has colds. Almost all of them bundle their infants up within an inch of their lives.

Unfortunately these women belong to the middle class. If they were poor a visiting nurse might set them right. As it is I send Miss Smith on errands of enlightenment. She has gotten Mrs. Beatty to the doctor with her baby's hand. She has taken Mrs. Lawrence's milk to be analyzed with the consequence that her baby has been weaned. The doctor said it was starving. Mrs. Lewis now, fearfully, feeds her baby water. Mrs. Williams has not yet opened her windows.

There must be millions of mothers like these; but until I came into a town of neighbors I never knew it. When I lived in the city I glibly relegated maternal ignorance to the slums. Now I feel sure it is everywhere. I am almost ready to stand for government regulation of the big business of being a mother.

The neighborhood is grateful for Miss Smith's assistance. A mother's club has been organized and she is sacrificing an afternoon off every week to tell them how to care for their children. Age-long dependence on instinct seems to have unfitted most of them for science; yet they may learn.

If I have had small success as a neighbor, at least, during my months of apprenticeship, I have learned my neighbors' creed, their secret creed that they seldom formulate or repeat even to themselves. It is this: I believe in the holiness of motherhood and the maternal instinct; I glory in them. I am a mother; my existence is justified; my position is secured; respect is my due. I would rather take care of my own baby badly than hire some one else to do it well; for that is my duty, my function. I may be content with incompetence but I believe that by learning on my first baby I shall, doubtless, do better with my next. I have no patience with women who shrink from their duty as mothers simply because they can perform some other work better. To do this is an attempt to rob motherhood of its sanctity, and bring to it the ignoble test of material success. Such mothers, therefore, constitute a challenge and a danger to all true mothers, and should, I believe, be looked upon with suspicion and distrust.

MARY EVANS.

Sanctuary

THE superintendent wished that the eminent visitor and his wife had chosen some other day to be shown through the factory. This was no weather to ask a man to move away from the electric fan and ice-water bottle in his office. July was pouring its worst heat wave through the dusty brick building. On the vast floor covered with rows of machines the noise seemed like the heat made audible—violent, incessant, pounding down over the rows of sweating women at the machines. The superintendent waved an explanatory hand, "This is the stitching-room," he shouted, and tried to hurry the visitors on. The eminent one was trying to make his wife hear him. "How do they get through it," he almost declaimed. "What force carries her, for instance, through a day like this?" and he pointed to a young girl bent over a thin steel plate under which hissed a gas flame.

"Ask her," said his wife. He stepped toward her. She looked up blankly, but before his question was half asked the superintendent intervened, foreseeing delay, and the visitors were ushered along. The girl sent a frown after them. They had intruded. She had been imagining in English, almost fluently too. They had broken everything up. Very well. She would go back to her own language. On a day like this when the gas under the steel plate added little whirring rings of heat to the fire from outside, it would perhaps be better to think of the white beaches at home. There would be a gray sky and long green waves breaking into foam and then cool swift water purling up around one's feet. It would make patterns on the firm sand, delicate wave lines, mermaid's lace. Or one could lie among the dunes and stare at the clouds and listen to the breakers.

The thick blanket of noise seemed suddenly to lift, to change, to rise and fall like the sea on a northern beach. She closed her eyes, a bad trick, for at that unguarded moment a hot pain stung her hand,—the automatic movement had swerved a little and the gas had clawed at her fingers.

English was better. She would return to the land she had created out of Quo Vadis. They had interrupted her when she was seated on a marble bench, or perhaps it was a carved ivory chair, anyway it was in a cool atrium of Imperial Rome, and she had been trying to decide whether life would be more beautifully colored as the Christian heroine, Lygia, or as the pagan Eunice.

It was difficult to continue. But if she said "Imperial Rome" often enough perhaps the beauty would return, for the words were like pillared temples and white processions and the golden stateliness of Nero's court. She would be Eunice. Lygia

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was too ridiculously Christian with her scruples against wine and roses and unconverted lovers.

She would be Eunice, the slave of Petronius Arbiter.

The blanket of noise lifted again. There was fragrant silence in the atrium. She leaned against a marble seat and felt its chill through her thin tunic. There were roses on the floor, dark red against the white flags. A fountain plashed. Then the light tap of sandals on the stone. It was Petronius. She went to meet him. He smoothed the drapery from her arm and kissed it, from rounded shoulder to slender wrist. Cool shivering delight followed his lips. For a second she closed her eyes —and again the hot stinging pain bit into her fingers. Her hand had gone under instead of over the steel, and she sat staring at the little piece of burnt linen that should have been a collar tab.

The superintendent saw her as he was bustling back to the electric fan. He resented her apparent indifference to the wreck of good linen. "How do they get through the day," he quoted sarcastically, "that's how they do it, burning and tearing; damned foreigners. Here you!" he barked at her, "you're fined twenty-five cents for negligence."

She jumped a little, then smiled back at him, "It was worth more."

He started to answer, changed his mind and bustled on, mopping his baldness and muttering, "damn stupid foreigners."

The noise closed down behind him.

SIGNE K. TOKSVIG.

A COMMUNICATION

The War Policy of American and British Labor

IN its issue of May 25th the New Republic summarizes an account given by Mr. Arthur Gleason, in the Survey, of "the impression produced on British liberals and labor men by the American labor delegation," and, accepting this account as correct, adds some rather unfavorable comment upon the attitude assumed by these American visitors in Great Britain. That attitude, the New Republic considers, was not only such as to provoke "natural resentment" on the part of the British Labor leaders; it also was positively injurious to the efforts of men "like Henderson and Thomas who are the most effective opponents of the pacifist tendency." "In their attempt to keep the wage-earners faithful to the war," these men "meet with no support from the American unions and with no attempt to understand the motives of their proposed policy."

As a non-"labor" member of the Mission of which the labor delegation referred to formed a part, I have had some opportunity during the past two months to observe both the activities of the labor delegates, their relations with British trade union leaders, and the reaction of the general labor public in England and Scotland; and, in particular, I have made some attempt to analyze the real nature of the points at issue between the representatives of the American Federation of Labor, on the one hand, and Mr. Arthur Henderson and certain of his colleagues of the British Labor party, on the other hand. As a result, I am unable to persuade myself that the failure in understanding, in this case, lies wholly upon the side of the American delegates. There are some decidedly pertinent considerations which, as it seems to me, both Mr. Gleason and the New Republic have overlooked; and, as the matter is not without importance, I venture to try to point these considerations out. It should be added that I have not attended any of the private official conferences between British and American trade union representatives. But neither, I take it, has Mr. Gleason. Both sides, however, have, outside of these conferences, defined their respective position with sufficient fullness and frequency to justify an onlooker in drawing certain conclusions.

It is recognized by all concerned that, in Mr. Henderson's words, "difference between American and British labor does not affect aims but methods." Labor opinion in both countries, writes Mr. Gleason, "agrees on the programme of the War Aims Memorandum," which is "lifted over bodily from the policy of Woodrow Wilson." Upon what question of mere method, then, do the leaders of American organized labor differ with Mr. Henderson and his group? In this, answers Mr. Henderson: "British labor," unlike American, "seeks to reenforce military operations by a wise and discriminating use of the moral and political weapon." This is an attractive phrase, but it very much needs translation into the concrete. What "moral and political weapon" have British labor leaders proposed which their American confreres have repudiated? One, and one only: an international labor and socialist conference during the war, at which German and Austrian delegates shall be present. To this question of a conference the whole issue reduces; apart from it there is, I believe, no serious or substantive difference upon war policies between Mr. Henderson's party and the spokesmen of the American Federation of Labor.

But it is indispensable to any understanding of the situation that this project of a conference be also translated into concrete terms. What kind of conference is in question, and what is the real attitude towards it of Mr. Henderson and his associates? It might be supposed that what is under consideration is an attempt, by consultation, adjustment and compromise, to work out a programme of peace terms acceptable to the representatives both of the Central Empires and the Allied countries; that the delegates to such a conference would enter it in the spirit of negotiators anxious to arrive, by mutual concessions, at some modus vivendi. But, in fact, nothing of the sort is under contemplation. The "conference" of which certain British trade

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unionists like to talk is hedged about by them with the most rigorous conditions. For, in the first place, the inter-Allied War Aims Memorandum itself lays down "as an essential condition to an International Conference that the organizers of the Conference shall satisfy themselves that all organizations to be represented put in precise form, by a public declaration, their peace terms in conformity with the principles 'no annexations or punitive indemnities and the right of all peoples to self-determination,' and that they are working with all their power to obtain from their governments the necessary guaranties to apply those principles honestly and unreservedly to all questions dealt with at any official peace conference." What is more, it is unquestionable that the only evidence which the framers of this Memorandum would recognize, or could recognize as establishing an intent to apply these principles honestly and unreservedly, would be a public declaration of adhesion to the substance of the peace terms set forth in the Memorandum. To that programme the German delegates must openly and unequivocally commit themselves before the conference assembles. It is not proposed by Mr. Henderson that Allied delegates shall be sent to such a conference for the purpose of bargaining away any of the essential guaranties of a just, democratic and lasting peace, as defined in that document; what is proposed is merely a consultation as to means of giving its provisions effect.

The plan for a conference, then, is a purely conditional one. And nothing is clearer than that the conditions laid down are conditions contrary to fact; that none of the provisions specified are at present fulfilled, or are in the least likely to be fulfilled, until after the German military regime has either suffered a decisive defeat in the field or has been overthrown by a revolution at home. For the War Aims Memorandum demands (among other things) unification, independence and access to the sea for Poland; the nullification of all German claims to sovereignty over Alsace and Lorraine; the disgorging of Germany's acquisitions in the Russian Baltic provinces; the freeing of Palestine, Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia from Turkish rule; restoration and complete indemnification for Belgium; and autonomy for the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, with the possible substitution of "a free federation of Danubian states for the Austro-Hungarian Empire." It is certain that no delegates publicly and honestly committed to any such peace terms as these would be permitted by the Berlin government to leave Germany for the purpose of freely conferring with representatives of the Allies; it is, in fact, tolerably certain that any who even proposed doing anything of the sort would be promptly clapped into jail. A yet more fundamental condition for the possibility of a conference of the sort proposed is lacking; an acceptance, or even a sympathetic reception, of the inter-Allied peace programme by the leaders of German socialism. A press dispatch reports that at a meeting of the Socialist party committee in Berlin on May 31st, Herr Scheidemann declared that "the aims of the Entente Socialists," set forth in the memorandum, "were to a great extent in complete accord with the annexationist aims of the Entente government."

The whole project of a conference, in short—when the conditions which are an essential part of it are resolved into their concrete particulars—can readily be seen to be a chimera. No such gathering could conceivably be held, either now, or under any circumstances that are possible until the forces now in power in Germany are reduced to impotence; and when they are so reduced no such conference will be necessary as a means of winning the war. And Mr. Henderson has, when pressed, acknowledged that the idea of a conference is without relevancy to the present situation. Mr. Gleason quotes his phrases to the effect that the conference would be desirable only "if held at the proper moment" and "under proper conditions," and adds that "British labor is aware that neither the 'time' nor the 'conditions' are now 'proper.'" Nevertheless, Mr. Henderson continues to speak impressively but obscurely about "the use of the moral and political weapon," and to hold before the eyes of the British workingman the pleasing picture of a "conference with the representatives of German labor"—much as the syndicalist holds before the eyes of his followers the confessedly unrealizable "myth" of a general strike. Why Mr. Henderson does this I am not concerned to speculate. It is worth remembering, however, that, through the Stockholm affair, he came to be especially identified with the idea of an international conference; and that political parties or factions have before this found it difficult to drop an issue to which they had once committed themselves, even after they knew the issue to be dead.

The real difference between Mr. Henderson and his following and the American labor delegates should now be somewhat clearer. The object of the latter is the same as the object which the New Republic, no doubt rightly, ascribes to Mr. Henderson and his associates: "to keep the wage-earners faithful to the war." But evidently, in the opinion of our American labor leaders it is not an effective way of realizing this object, to distract the wage-earners' attention from the realities, and the grim and urgent requirements, of the present situation by constant talk about remote and improbable contingencies, and by praise of a "weapon" which cannot now, and in all likelihood cannot ever be actually employed. The question is essentially one of political psychology; and I think it cannot be doubted that the political psychology underlying the methods of the American labor delegates is the shrewder and the sounder of the two. Not only does talk of a conference divert the minds of many from the business in hand, but it also is interpreted by many as favorable to the programme of "peace by negotiation" supported by the unsuccessful candidate at the recent Keighley election. I cannot think that the task of those who would keep the British wage-earner "faithful to the war" has been rendered more difficult by the visit of the American labor delegation; on the contrary—and I speak, in this matter, as an outside observer—I am confident that the effect of that visit has, in the main, been wholesome, bracing and clarifying. It has simply reenforced the position of the group of trade union leaders who are, I think, unquestionably representative of the now dominant temper of British labor—such men as Barnes, Roberts, Tillett, Appleton, Duncan, Crooks, Thorne and Havelock Wilson. With these men the American delegates seemed to find themselves in heartiest sympathy; and assuredly, these are not the men who have played the least part during these four years in "keeping a great mass of weary and enervated wage-earners loyal to the war."

In two particulars, however, and one of them an im-

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portant particular, the activities of the American labor delegates in England and France are open to some legitimate criticism. Their tone and manner, or at least the tone and manner of their chairman, in dealing with those with whom they differed were often needlessly brusque, harsh and unconciliatory. The suaviter in modo is apparently not considered an essential in American trade union diplomacy. And they seemed to me in their public utterances to give too little specific emphasis to the more constructive parts of President Wilson's programme of war aims, to which, however, in general terms, they gave unqualified support. Concerning the hope of preventing future wars and future acts of international injustice by the establishment of a genuine Society of Nations, the spokesmen abroad of the American Federation of Labor had apparently little to say. Yet this, surely, is the supreme hope and object of America in the war. It is also the only hope which can in the long run be relied upon to keep the laboring masses of the Allied countries steadfast through the immeasurable sacrifices which the war imposes upon them. It is not by an endless reiteration of the phrases "German autocracy" and "making the world safe for democracy" that the plain man can be steeled to endure all things for the sake of defeating the German military power. His very hatred and weariness of the war must be made into motives for continuing it until mankind can win adequate guaranties against the recurrence of these abominations. "Never again!" is the battle cry that touches most deeply the general heart. And such a cry, while it directs attention to the urgent political task of organizing an effective League of Nations—and of beginning its organization *now*—does not tend to direct attention from the hard military necessities of the moment. For there is no argument easier to make clear to the man of plain common sense than that which shows it to be the first pre-condition to the establishment of a secure, just and peaceful international order, that the arch-enemies of such an order shall be defeated, discredited by disaster, and rendered powerless to convert human society a second time into the thing of horror that it now is.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

Portrait of Young Love

If you were with me — as you're not, of course!
I'd taste the exquisite tortures of despair,
With a slow, languid, Epicurean tongue;
Puzzle for days on one particular stare;
And if you knew a word's peculiar force,
And what you looked like when you were quite young.

You'd lift me Heaven-high — till a word grated,
Dash me Hell-deep — oh that luxurious pit!
Fatly and deep encushioned with self-pity,
Where Grief's a connoisseur not quickly sated!
What mournful musics wander over it,
Faint-blown from some long-lost celestial city!

Such bitter joyousness I'd have, and action,
Were you here — be no more the fool who broods
On true Adventure till he wakes her scorning.
— But we're too petty for such noble warning!
— And I find just as perfect satisfaction
In analyzing these and other moods!

STEPHEN VINCENT BENET.

CORRESPONDENCE

Women Industrial Leaders

SIR: The National War Council of the Y. W. C. A., realizing that there are few women with sufficient training available for positions as industrial supervisors of women in industry, has offered to Bryn Mawr College a sum of money to meet the expenses of a training course to prepare women under the Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department. The object of the course is to prepare women for industrial positions, through which they may aid in the solution of the present industrial problems affecting women. These problems have arisen as a result of the increasing number of women, both single and married, being employed either because of the expansion of industry or because of the drafting of men for the Army. The positions for which such courses prepare them are employment managers, industrial superintendents of women's work, welfare superintendents, industrial secretaries and leaders, investigators of industrial problems affecting women, and factory inspectors.

The plan provides for three groups of courses, one beginning June 10, 1918; one beginning October 1, 1918, and one February 1, 1919. These courses will last for eight months. The work in the summer will be for one month at Bryn Mawr and for three months in New England factories, under the supervision of Miss Anne Bezanson, who is to have charge of the work in labor courses at Bryn Mawr next year. The fall work will be the regular courses offered under this Department and cooperating departments of the College, together with additional courses in industrial hygiene and employment management. The field work will be conducted in the industrial establishments in and about Philadelphia and the training in factory inspection will be carried on in cooperation with the State Department of Labor and Industry. Scholarships to the value of $300 are being offered by the War Council of the Y. W. C. A. The minimum expense will be about $400. There is a very large demand for the positions for which these courses will prepare women.

The purpose of the course has the hearty endorsement of Mr. Felix Frankfurter, Chairman of the United States Labor Policies Board, and effective cooperation with the Board is assured. The course is planned with the endorsement of the office of Secretary of War, and is approved by Dr. E. M. Hopkins, in charge of Industrial Relations of the Quartermaster's Department.

Fuller information may be secured from Professor Susan M. Kingsbury, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.

SUSAN M. KINGSBURY.

Bryn Mawr College.

Sculpture and Egotism

SIR: It is a curious lack of perspective which so often leads on the friends of the dead to their memorial enterprises. What advantage is it to the memory of the respected and even important dead to have an ugly portrait *in aere triplice* occupying a conspicuous site or vista to its irreparable damage? What public or private virtue is fittingly commemorated by the uglification of a part of the public domain?

Truly the pseudo-friends of the great departed have a good time running hither and thither importuning and

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making themselves busy. But their fatal mistake is the false ideal they set before themselves. They set out to celebrate the small virtue of an individual. They do not set before themselves the highest beauty of their city. They make that secondary which should be primary, and make that primary which is comparatively unimportant.

Do the ugly figures that flank the Central Park Mall truly celebrate Columbus and Shakespeare and Scott and Bobby Burns and Fitz-Greene Halleck? No. They celebrate the standards of the people who designed and erected them—not alone their aesthetic standards, but their literary and historical standards as well. Our parents' literary and historical standards were in the main correct, but their sense of beauty was in hibernation. The sculptures of the Mall are a complete demonstration. They, indeed, do no damage to the secure immortals. But how about Halleck? What if the only thing the average person knows about the honored dead is an absurd statue?

And so it is with these friends of the dead. They foozle when they do not play with their eye on the ball of civic beauty. When the friends of a deserving warrior rally to erect a statue to his memory and to the celebration of his service to the country, they do not seek to embellish with either his figure or an allegorical representation of his virtue some structure like Grant's Tomb nakedly awaiting the comfort of sculpture. That would be to subordinate their hero. They do not reflect that their hero is already irrevocably subordinated and gains most by being fittingly attached to some greater thing. The horses on the portico of San Marco gain both in beauty and fame by their subordination to that wonderful edifice. But the pseudo-friends snatch at some prominent spot all by itself, to be dominated by their irrelevant figure. And so neither the Tomb gets its needed sculpture, nor the figure its appropriate site.

The time is coming when war heroes will be candidates for post-bellum honors, and New York and other cities will be making a survey of their sculpture sites. But pending that should not the art societies and their friends take a survey of their own mental processes?

A. S. B.

What Soldiers Read

SIR: You—I—everyone—hears much of what soldiers read. Soldiers are apt to be almost anything or anybody. Why try to classify what they read?

They read many English novels, much popular fiction, much modern poetry. In the Y. M. C. A. library at this aviation school, supposedly attracting the highest type of men mentally, there is much Kipling, some George Moore, some Gorki—and much litter. (Not that I mean to discriminate by separating the litter.) There are no books by Turgenev, no books of Walt Whitman's poems, no Browning. To reach a camp library a book must be what usually goes to the Salvation Army, or popularly acclaimed. Robert Service's "poems"? Yes, they are here—in quantity. The men do read the books sent them, too, if they read at all. The college men are no exception; many are the ones who avow Kipling and Service great poets; college didn't rescue them. Why?

American colleges, however, do not recognize, not really you know, that Scandinavia, with Ibsen, Strindberg—Russia with Gogol, Pushkin, Turgenev, Dostoevski, exist, in literature. Anglo-Saxon literature is broad enough, much too broad in fact, to engross the interest of either American universities or students.

If some one, in some insidious manner, were made to believe that English literature is not the greatest literature in the world, that much greater exists if one were only able to get to it, he would have to look elsewhere than to American schools for the truth of the matter.

American soldiers, like all Americans, read just what America and her schools have taught them to read. They like pretty stories, romances, tales of adventure, detective stories—*action* in fact.

Books with a philosophical background—banish the thought. We red-blooded Americans want stories with a kick and the good old jazz in them.

ROBERT M. MCALMON.

132nd Aero Squadron,
Rockwell Field, San Diego, California.

Jews as Radicals

SIR: The Jew as internationalist is a romantic wanderer, compelling the imagination. His antiquity, his agonies, his unique survival—all these have been poetic facts worn smooth by the orator and the historian until we can hear no more of them. Yet the revolutionary Jew in Russia again intrigues the interest.

The Jew has, of course, been always the radical leader. On the other hand there is no conservative so thoroughgoing—also so numerous—as your middle-class Jew. Therefore we may deduce that the Jew as radical has been conspicuous because he has been the radical as Jew. And those who have been minded—rather distrustfully as yet because one does not know, with the present rapid mutations, just how events will fall—to add to the material of their anti-Semitism the facts of Trotzkyism must in justice remember that they will have with them in their prejudices more than a majority of economically stable Jewry.

Surely the self-consciousness of the Jew is justified by the limelight which is at once thrown on him in whatsoever role he walks. It has perhaps made him the more compact and finished actor. He is alert with more intensity for his task; his nervous reactions are sharper and more vivid.

What the processes of toleration may do to him is a living after-the-war speculation. The Jewish problem in America has been more largely than one would think the fact of Russia. A problem also of increasing and not quickly assimilated immigration. The ethical obligation of the more fortunate Jew has been to remain a Jew for his brothers' helping. The Jewish consciousness has been compacted by persecution. Cosmopolite as the Jew is, he may not survive the disintegrating effects of democracy.

It is suggestive—the figure of him as non-resistant among the occidental nations of a Christian civilization. Ever, perhaps not by choice, the Christ-nation among the followers of the Romans. Through the centuries that have lived by the sword, the believer in the Word made flesh.

Perhaps somewhat compensatory has been the fostering of his ethical mission. The chosen of the Lord for the salvation of nations—the Teutons have usurped invidiously certain of his phraseology. A democratic world may be sceptical as to a group or nationalistic obligation to spread even righteousness.

There is now a crumbling of institutions—perhaps a revaluation of all values. In an age of religious alienations the Jew has remained a logical entity; in a period of clamant nationalisms he has tended zealously the flame of race. The ironic destinies await with interest the emergence of him in the new world that is making.

R. F.

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The Pretty Lady

The Pretty Lady, by Arnold Bennett. New York: G. H. Doran Co. $1.50.

IN Mr. Arnold Bennett, it is convenient to say, there are two seams of personality. From the more difficult seam he has extracted his masterpieces. In those few volumes, subdued yet rich and varied, he has exhibited a power of keeping his sensations inside the frame of permanent human relationships and sympathies. He has taken the commonest of themes—brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, aunts and uncles—and to them he has given full yet beautifully measured consideration, thronging his account of them with that plenitude of detail which is never successful unless penetrated with emotion. In regard to everything that concerns those domiciliary themes Mr. Bennett has been master. If one thinks of them as material to be matured, few gestations have been so perfect as his gestation of the philistine Five Towns.

But there is another Mr. Bennett, a Mr. Bennett whose capacity for sensation singularly outruns his capacity for emotion, a cheaper and more vivacious Mr. Bennett who has left the Philistia that nourished him to strut in Paris and London. This second Mr. Bennett is a much more flashing person, but where in the Five Towns he was truly a man of the world, in the world he is essentially a man of the Five Towns. This is not his intention. All aware inside of the deficiencies that are native to philistine England and to himself, Mr. Bennett's pride requires a high attitude, and he quickly affects the airs of what he considers "connoisseurship" and fastidiousness, and he takes the vengeance of ostentation on the world that reproves his uneasiness. This gaucherie is only important because it deranges Mr. Bennett's sympathies. Where he is thoroughly at home an extraordinary degree of sympathy emanates from him. Where he is not sure of himself, his vanity and self-consciousness impede him and he becomes extremely anxious to show that he is "initiated" and "understands life." The real man, the Wordsworthian Englishman in him, is only accessible when experience has mellowed him and assured him that he is in no way absurd.

In The Pretty Lady Mr. Bennett is more assured about London than heretofore, but on the whole it is rather a bad assurance. There are frequent passages so finished and lustrous that Mr. Wells in all his glory has scarcely excelled them, but the totality of the book is inferior. The brightness of the surface, however, is stabbing. How is a novelist to give prompt effectiveness to the moral chaos of the war? Mr. Bennett understands England well enough to know that nothing could so instantaneously mark a change in the whole tone of life as the installment of a prostitute at the centre of interest, so quite coolly and deliberately he focusses the British institution of the music-hall promenade, and from that market of sexuality he takes a French cocotte and he places her at the heart of his story. The significance of this choice is its definite relation to the war. The leave-train from the front brings the drunken officer to her, and it is she who dresses the officer hurriedly to rush him back to France. Her neighbor is a "Russian" cocotte just back from the Irish rebellion—the discarded companion of a member of the Irish administration, now linked up with a colonel. The "night clubs" attract others, youths back from Suvla and elderly men home for a week-end, men who have done their duty by their relatives and are now "on the loose." Mr. Bennett's frankness about fornication, the Londoner's acceptance of unlimited fornication as the concomitant of war, is enough in itself to upset the pieties of the old order; but in addition to this disclosure of "the pretty lady" as a much-needed consolatrix there are the personages of Lady Queenie Paulle and Concepcion Iquist, "super-celebrated" pursuers of sensation up to and beyond the ordinary limits. The shadows cast by the monde and the demi-monde interlace and entangle in this novel. The link to its three conspicuous women is a well-off bachelor of nearly fifty. A sensible, substantial Englishman, he is romantic enough to give himself to war-work once the implications of the war reach him; and he is matter-of-fact enough to accept from the French girl, Christine, the voluptuous girlishness that his fifty-year nature enjoys.

By letting down the barriers of respectability, Mr. Bennett is enabled to represent in full measure the torrent of his sensations from the war. To him the war is more than a political exigency. It is something that has come out of the lairs of human nature—a force stronger than all the civilized restraints from which it has plunged forward, slavering and panting. "The war was growing," his hero reflects, "or the sense of its measureless scope was growing. It had sprung, not out of this crime or that, but out of the secret invisible roots of humanity, and it was widening to the limits of evolution itself. It transcended judgment. It defied conclusions and rendered equally impossible both hope and despair. . . . The supreme lesson of the war was its revelation of what human nature actually was." This is a candor quite different from the candor of statesmen, and by taking three women on the edges of class—the cocotte, the spoiled and reckless aristocratic girl, the adventurous masculine woman with starved emotions—Mr. Bennett adds to the revelation, shows how tremendously the war has registered on personal conduct, and on no conduct so illustrative as sex-conduct.

Up to a certain point it is done brilliantly. The material that the war has poured in on Mr. Bennett he has manipulated with amazing skill. It is not merely that he narrates a conversation at the club with a new muscularity, or describes a state funeral or an air-raid or an inquest with superlative economy and force. He gives also a most vigorous and sardonic version of the vulgar fashionableness of war-work, the "vicious foolery of government departments," the bathos of war-benefits and pageants and bazaars, the hysterical efficiency of women's contribution to making munitions, on the Clyde. There are, in addition, bits of humanity such as the officer giving the prostitute his mascot, the kind of naïveté that is so revelatory. Mr. Bennett is munificent in The Pretty Lady, and his terseness was never so effective.

But, interesting as it is to every one to read about prostitution, I do not think that Christine's fate really engaged Mr. Bennett. He says, in effect, "See! I know the inmost secrets of this young thing. I read her like a book." All too visibly he licks his chops in the delight of possessing such insight. Her Catholicism, in particular, he rejoices to reveal. But just as he calls the Blessed Virgin a "goddess" and so misses the essence of devotion to the *Mother* of God, so he exhibits a pretentious smartness in much of his account of women throughout. "Lady Queenie Paulle entered rather hurriedly, filling the room with a distinguished scent. . . . Lady Queenie obviously had what is called 'race.'" Discernments like these remind one of The Duchess. Christine's mysticism and Lady

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Queenie's " race " are part of Mr. Bennett's paraphernalia. His real purpose is to project the sensations that the war has loaded on him, not to develop or reveal these characters.

The inept ending of The Pretty Lady discloses the poverty on this side of Mr. Bennett's inspiration. He has found little in Queenie or Christine or Concepcion or G. J. Hoape, but admirable puppets for his present game. The game, however, is a thrilling one. It is to preserve the sensations of 1914-1917. And if Mr. Bennett had not himself shown the artistic superiority of possessing personalities rather than sensations, his novel might be warmly praised.

F. H.

W. H. Mallock

The Limits of Democracy, by W. H. Mallock. New York: E. P. Dutton. $6.00.

THERE is a class of people among whom it is fashionable to believe that democracy is incapable of self-government. Retired professional men, old soldiers, the lady-devotees of Freud and Tagore, great business men, all of them make merry over the idea that the sovereignty of the people could, in any but an illusory form, be applied to the processes of everyday life. They tell you how eagerly the manager searches for industrial talent. They explain how every private is by nature on the threshold of generalship. The public — witness Hall Caine and Eleanor Porter and Marie Corelli — aches for the advent of new talent. But genius does not spring from the people. Birth and wealth unfailingly tell. They give an air, an inherited understanding of the finer nuances, a more delicate fibre, that you can only get in Back Bay in Boston or Upper Fifth Avenue in New York.

It is, of course, uncomfortable to feel abroad a fairly widespread disinclination to accept these obvious formulæ. Peoples are tragically unwilling to accept the stations into which it has pleased God to call them. Discontent is the keynote of the time. Women positively elbow each other to get into the social column. There is acute competition for boxes at the Opera. There are even people daring enough to sneer openly at the Colonial Dames. It is high time that a safeguard against this democratic eruption was provided. In Russia the masses are getting out of hand; noblemen who used to be handed round on Fifth Avenue are now selling newspapers on the Nevsky Prospect. In England trade unionists and other impossible people are in the government and a dissenter is actually prime minister. The ablest statesman of France is reputed to be a professional Socialist. Even in America, less pathetically invaded than otherwhere by this chimera, the President of the American Federation of Labor has become a personage. In Back Bay and Upper Fifth Avenue they feel quite uncomfortable about it. They want two or three neat arguments to clinch this idle kind of talk. It invades the colleges and the minds of all the better students are being poisoned. The boys ask their fathers horrid questions and the girls talk of the slums almost as if they equalled the Red Cross in importance. It is to the aid of this baffled intelligentsia that, at a somewhat high price, Mr. Mallock has come.

When I first read Mr. Mallock's book I thought it was by my friend, Stephen Leacock — there could not be two such men in one world. No one, I thought, could so admirably discredit the present social system by the simple analysis here made of the argument by which the leisured class arms in self-defense. It is so gloriously unintelligent, so splendidly devoid of even an elementary knowledge of economics, so appallingly super-serious in tone, that no one, I urged to myself, could possibly write it except as a squib. But further reflection has convinced me of my error. Mr. Mallock really thinks he has dismissed the case for democracy. And there is other evidence to hand. He has written other volumes in which, in the odd intervals of religious treatises, a brilliant satire, and novels worse even than those of which Jowett is said to have prophesied the appearance, these same arguments are to be found. Some of them he made twenty years ago; and no man could be so utterly inhuman as to go on making the same bad joke for twenty years once he knew it was a joke. And at least he would not publish it at six dollars. In England, moreover, eminent clergymen have written to that dear grandmother of us all, the London Spectator, urging its gratuitous distribution among workingmen to counteract the poison distilled by the Labor party. Colonels on half-pay are eager in its praise. The fire-eaters of Berkeley Square adore it. It is read with enthusiasm in cathedral close and country rectory by maiden aunts and clerical old women.

It is all so simple when Mr. Mallock explains it. People are roughly divided into two types, the able and the average. Those who have a large income are able people and those who have a small income are average people. The Duke of Manchester, Mr. Harry Thaw, and the Crown Prince of Germany are able people; professors like Sir Ernest Rutherford, scholars like Delisle, trade unionists like Mr. Henderson, poets like Francis Thompson are just average people. Labor gets more than its fair share of the industrial product. If twenty workmen labor without direction they produce x goods between them; enter the manager and they produce 3x; — 2x is thus, as Mr. Mallock explains to his contented audience, the obvious production of capital. So that to talk of the worker being robbed or of his slavery to capitalism is nonsense. The worker really has a bully good time through the eagerness of capital to rob itself.

There is the problem also of government. Here Mr. Mallock has made a very vital discovery. He has found that all the world over the business of the state is confided into a few hands. So that the famous Gettysburg formula of Mr. Lincoln was devoid of meaning. The classic opening sentence of Rousseau's elegant piece of sophistical trifling is not, says Mr. Mallock, true even in its obstetrical sense; for a baby is not born free but helpless. There is more truth in a dictum of Mr. Cecil Chesterton, but, of course, he had the opportunity of access to Mr. Mallock's earlier books, so that he was better placed than Lincoln or Rousseau for the question. Now if every society is conducted by an oligarchy, an oligarchy must get control because it is fitted to rule; the present order is conducted by an oligarchy and therefore it is fitted to rule. Or, rather, it is, in a new sense, an aristocracy, less delicate perhaps, less refined than the old, but with more vigor and more alertness. It is even more humanitarian. It is willing, says Mr. Mallock, to grant a minimum wage, to give respect to man as man, and to pay a higher wage to special ability, though, of course, it must take precautions against " indolence, carelessness, and lack of prompt obedience " on the part of the worker. Security of employment is essential; but since it is due rather to increase of population, work remaining stationary, or stationary popu-

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lation with decrease of work, that, doubtless, can be remedied.

If this is the best argument against democracy, the world is in better case than one hoped. If its opponents do not know, as Mr. Mallock does not know, the difference between a responsible and elective government and an oligarchy; if they are ignorant, as Mr. Mallock is ignorant, of the difference between payment to ability and payment to capital; there is reason to believe that the coming period of reconstruction will teach them and him. I agree with the Dean of Carlisle (or was it the dear Archdeacon?) that this book ought to be distributed broadcast. But I have more confidence in the vigilance of the British censor than to believe that he would for one moment permit the workers to despair of the aristocratic intellectuals as Mr. Mallock would make them despair. This book would give them that "conscious knowledge of effortless superiority" from which might be born a forgetfulness of their station.

H. J. L.

Woman Power

Women and War Work, by Helen Fraser. New York: Arnold Shaw. $1.50. Women War Workers, edited by Gilbert Stone. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. $1.65. Women of the War, by Barbara McLaren. New York: George H. Doran Co. $1.25.

IF it were not commonly known one would soon decide from reading these books that it is superfluous to enumerate the occupations in which the women of England have replaced men. Wherever there are occupations women are in them. According to Miss Fraser's figures, given in 1917, 1,252,000 women have directly replaced men in industry; 1,000,000 are making munitions; 258,000 are doing agricultural labor, and 83,000 are in government departments.

Miss Fraser's book is an attempt to cover the whole field of Englishwomen's war work. It is too obviously a hasty joining together of popular lecture material, but even casual treatment cannot spoil the remarkable evidence of the facts at her disposal. What there is to say about the mobilization of women as doctors, nurses, "comforteers," munition-makers, workers in all industries and as farm laborers, is a text thrilling in itself. Certain Americans, however, have a tendency to remember the thrill and forget the lessons of experience which go with it. For them the chapter on the Protection of Women in Industry is a valuable reminder of the connection between health and output. Equally instructive to an administration which is inclined to accept the advice of women without delegating authority to them, is the long list of important government committees on which Englishwomen are serving, and the statement that the Food Controller has two women co-directors.

If Miss Fraser presents the bare facts of women's war work, the book edited by Gilbert Stone clothes facts with the warm humanity of personal narrative. In it, different women tell of their day's work — the post-woman, the woman bus-conductor, and the "butcher-boy girl," as well as the munition worker and the army nurse. Their plain, half-humorous accounts of trials and rewards give one a far deeper sense of their worth than all Miss Fraser's elaborate pathos about "the spirit of women." The authors of these sketches reveal their identity only in the inconspicuous contents, a rare and refreshing modesty in the world of war books.

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Very probably the women whose individual achievements are described by the Hon. Mrs. McLaren, in Women of the War, have the same splendid disinterestedness about their work, nevertheless the book leaves one with a suspicion of the upper-class advertising which is an accompaniment, often undesired, of upper-class volunteer work. For instance: Mrs. McLaren singles out Lady Mary Hamilton as a typical munition worker and praises her success. She also mentions a "former kitchen maid," who works a 900 h. p. Willans plant. This woman "starts the engine herself, if required, watches the voltmeter, and regulates the governor accordingly, wipes the commutators and regulates the brushes." Both women are certainly to be commended. But the "daughter of the Duke of Abercorn" is starred by name and the kitchen maid — remains one.

Aside from this and similar slight irritations produced by what appears as hypersensitiveness to the good works of the peerage, Mrs. McLaren's book is decidedly worth reading. It is well and simply written, and the chapters on the work of Dr. Elsie Englis, Miss Edith Stoney, Dr. Florence Stoney and Lady Paget stir one to the most unqualified admiration for the courage and tirelessness and wisdom of these women. Nor is one less inclined to doubt her tribute to such inspired workers as Miss Lillian Barker, of Woolwich Arsenal, and Miss Edith Holden, matron of a great base hospital. One doesn't doubt any of Mrs. McLaren's tributes. But the admixture of a few more kitchen maids, named, would have made clearer what the authors of all three books more or less dimly realize, the democratiza-

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tion of English society made possible partly by this mingling of women in war work. As yet it is probably too early for a book seeing beyond the emergency of the war to the permanently important question of the effect of women's new work on themselves.

S. K. T.

Oxford Ideas

The Oxford Stamp, by Frank Aydelotte. New York: Oxford University Press.

WHY do not all American professors write with the vigor and simplicity of Mr. Aydelotte? These ten papers are worth reprinting if for nothing else than to show what pertinent and applicable ideas one Rhodes Scholar brought home from Oxford to his profession of the college teaching of English. His mind returned from Oxford neither sentimental nor rarefied, but with a wise perception of what the American student could wisely take from the Oxford stamp. Professor Aydelotte responded less to the historic charm of Oxford than to the sense of the "good life" which he found there, and which the American college community so often lacks. The hospitable interchange of ideas, the healthy amateur sport, fused into a setting of simple and yet comfortable living, which he pictures, is itself a searching criticism of our sense of what a college should be. What Oxford taught him was the possibility of a genuine intellectual community of "young men, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic and observant," where discussion and study became as natural as sport.

Our unhealthy, exaggerated athletic tone Professor Aydelotte finds in the gladiatorial character of our sport, as contrasted with the Oxford disinterested and amateur activities. "Games run for the benefit of the spectator," he says, "always degenerate morally, for the reason that the spectator is irresponsible morally, and demands that his team win at any cost." The paradox is that only when the spectators are either abolished or trained in sport can athletics take its proper subordination in the college world.

As a teacher of English, Professor Aydelotte brings an idea of the classics not "as mere entertainers whose business it is to provide elegant amusement for our idle hours," as our own shoddy defenders of the "humanities" would use them. Rather should they be made to serve for "a study of men and of currents of thought." And to show how novel this attitude still is among us, he quotes M. Lanson, who could not find among students or professors in the American colleges the feeling for an "explication des textes," which should cultivate a personal reaction from the reading, and an effort to determine the significance of an epoch and the individuality of the writer as a man. The Oxford Stamp rescues literary studies from that dreary futility of philology, on the one hand, and sentimental "appreciation," on the other, into which they have fallen in our colleges.

Contributors

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT—A graduate of Bryn Mawr College. Author of French Perspectives. Has been in France for several months and is contributing a series of articles to the New Republic.

WILLIAM HARD—Is a writer on public affairs, now investigating problems of organization in Washington for the New Republic.

FREDERIC C. HOWE—Commissioner of Immigration of the port of New York, and a writer on economics.

MARY EVANS—Is a pseudonym.

SIGNE K. TOKSVIG—Was graduated from Cornell in 1916, and is now on the staff of the New Republic.



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